Right-wing populists are in power in many parts of the world. Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump are among the most prominent, but there are many other influential right-wing populist heads of states. These include Benjamin Netanyahu who has been Prime Minister of Israel since 2009; Viktor Orban who has been Prime Minister of Hungary since 2010; Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who has held the central position in Turkey since 2003 (first as Prime Minister and now as President); Rodrigo Duterte who was elected President of the Philippines in 2016; and Yoweri Museveni who won his fifth term in Uganda as President in 2016. In India, Narendra Modi campaigned as a right-wing populist to win the 2014 Lok Sabha elections handsomely for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Unlike other right-wing populists (Mr. Orban just won another election easily), it appears that Mr. Modi’s populist appeal is waning ahead of his re-election bid. Many groups are up in arms against the Modi-led BJP government at the Centre: Students at various universities are protesting; Dalits are on the streets against a perceived dilution of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, weeks after the Supreme Court order; and there is widespread outrage following the government’s delayed response to the rapes of two minor girls, one allegedly by a BJP MLA in Uttar Pradesh. Even the business community is disappointed. Why is this the case?
Three strategies
Populist leaders like Mr. Modi come to power using three strategies: They present themselves as outsiders fighting against an elite, they use populism to attract new and younger voters to the polls, and they continuously rail either against the establishment or an imagined enemy who stands in the way of the nation achieving greatness. Mr. Modi portrayed himself as an outsider and, more importantly, a challenger to the long-entrenched political hierarchies in Lutyens’ Delhi. He wore his humble background on his sleeve, depicting the choice between him and Congress leader Rahul Gandhi as a contest between a ‘ chaiwallah ’ (tea-seller) and a ‘ shehzada’ (prince). Flaunting his chaiwallah credentials, Mr. Modi railed against the Congress establishment which he depicted as elitist and out of touch with the problems of the common man. He promised to change things for people.
This populist appeal brought new voters to the polls, and the voter turnout in 2014 was eight percentage points higher than in 2009. Data from the National Election Surveys of 2009 and 2014, collected by Lokniti-Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, show a clear link between the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance’s performance in 2014 and the increase in turnout. If we compare the percentage point increase in turnout at the constituency-level with the winning party in that constituency, we find that the BJP and its allies had a higher likelihood of winning seats where the turnout increase was the greatest. For instance, in 2014, the NDA won 67 out of the 70 seats (96%) where the voter turnout went up by over 15 percentage points since 2009. In the 145 seats that saw turnout go up by 10-15 percentage points, the NDA won 125 seats, a success rate of 86%. In the 267 seats where turnout increase was less than 10 percentage points, the NDA won 123 seats (46%). And in seats where the polling percentage decreased compared to 2009, the NDA won only 21 of 61 such seats, a strike rate of just 34%.
Furthermore, in the past, the turnout among young voters (18-25 years) was low relative to national turnout figures. For example, analysis suggests that the turnout among this group was 52% in 2004 and 54% in 2009, when the national turnout was 58%. However, in 2014, the turnout among young voters was 68% while the national turnout stood lower at 66%. Similarly, this increase in turnout (compared to 2009) was also higher among the middle classes than the poor. The young and the middle class were Mr. Modi’s social base. His populist strategy, coupled with the strong organisational prowess of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, channelised this aspirational segment to turn up in high numbers to vote for the BJP.
Part of the establishment
Four years later, while Mr. Modi’s popularity remains reasonably stable, his populist appeal has diminished. He is no longer the scrappy politician with a humble background leading an insurgency against the Delhi elite, but rather an incumbent Prime Minister heading a full majority government. He is now part of the very elite that he railed against and his demeanour and clothes reflect this. His speeches sound less of an energetic, hopeful and a populist insurgent, but more of a tired paternalist leader telling people what they should and shouldn’t do. Two young, avid BJP supporters said to us that Mr. Modi’s speeches are now those of an old man hectoring the young. Mr. Modi’s populism has also suffered from his focus on governance. As he has become part of the establishment — in fact, the establishment itself — he can no longer point to state institutions as opponents to implementing his agenda. If Mr. Modi can no longer present himself as an outsider or point to the ‘deep state’ as thwarting his agenda to make India great again, his ability to bring voters to the polls will be affected.
Many of those who were enthused by his populism four years ago may choose to stay at home in the 2019 elections. These voters had given the BJP the critical edge in 2014, bringing the party to power by achieving an unprecedented vote-seat ratio.
Options before 2019
What are Mr. Modi’s options then? With a year to go before the next Lok Sabha elections, it will be difficult for the Modi government to improve perceptions of its governance record considerably. Mr. Modi also won’t succeed with the same populist strategy that brought him to power. He is not an outsider, nor is he anti-establishment. The only approach for him remains to reinvent brand Modi and present himself as a challenger to the system despite being a part of it. This strategy has been used successfully by some right-wing populists such as Mr. Erdoğan and Mr. Orban who have been campaigning as outsiders from the day they come to power. This option is not available to Mr. Modi because he embedded himself in the power structure the very day he was elected.
If Mr. Modi can no longer successfully recapture his image as the angry outsider fighting the causes of the masses, what should he do? In our view, he would then need to undertake some disruptive policy measures in the coming months to energise voters to turn out to vote in high numbers. If he cannot bring a large number of voters to the polls, the road back to power in 2019 will be far bumpier than expected.
Pradeep Chhibber currently visiting the University of Barcelona and Rahul Verma is with the University of California, Berkeley. Harsh Shah is an alumnus of the University of California, Berkeley
