‘De-Ba’athification was a recipe for disaster’

Zalmay Khalilzad on the successes and failures of the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq

May 08, 2016 01:32 am | Updated October 25, 2017 10:26 am IST

Afghanistan-born Zalmay Khalilzad has been the highest-ranking Muslim in the U.S. administration and has worked under President George W. Bush in various capacities. He was Ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq during the U.S.-led invasions, and played a major role in shaping the U.S.’s policies in West Asia. His memoir, The Envoy: From Kabul to the White House, My Journey Through a Turbulent World, has just been published, offering fresh insight into the American conduct of the wars.

Mr. Khalilzad was also in the news recently for hosting Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump’s foreign policy speech in Washington. Excerpts from an interview in which he speaks about Mr. Bush, former President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf, and Mr. Trump:

What went wrong in Iraq?

A lot of people say there was no plan after the invasion. There was a plan, in fact. I was the presidential envoy before Paul Bremer was announced. I was aware of what we were planning to do after the invasion — which was liberation, not occupation. We would turn over power quickly to the Iraqis, appoint an interim authority, and the military would be reformed to get rid of elements who were party to torture and oppression.

Total dismantling of the Ba’athist army was not part of the plan?

Not part of the plan at all. When Ambassador Bremer became the chief of the occupation authority, he told the Iraqis the plan to hand over the government was no longer valid. He was going to be the government. That upset a lot of pro-invasion Iraqis. De-Ba’athification was to be a selective judicial process, but they did it as a political process. This was a recipe for disaster.

Two men running to be presidential candidates, Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, say the entire chaos in the region began with the invasion of Iraq. Do you agree?

There was a lot of conflict and instability there already — the Iran-Iraq war, the Palestine-Israel conflict, the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Afghan civil war, al-Qaeda’s emergence… the list is long. After the Cold War victory, we thought we were the only superpower and we could change things. Terrorism emerged as an issue in the meantime.

The U.S. seems to be struggling to get right the equation involving Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. How do you see the future?

One of the failures of our diplomacy was that when the USSR invaded Afghanistan, they were seen as a dangerous and strong enemy. The U.S. was startled. The U.S. had accommodated the loss of a friendly government to the Iranian revolution. But the Soviet response to a similar situation in Afghanistan was aggressive. The U.S. then became dependent on Pakistan to inflict a cost on the Soviets, to deter them from further expansion. When the Soviet began to discuss withdrawal, we initially did not believe [them]. In 1987, my efforts were to open a direct channel to Afghanistan rather than going though the Pakistanis. And when the Soviets left, we disengaged, and civil war erupted, regional powers entered the scene, and the Taliban and al-Qaeda emerged. We should not have contracted the Afghan resistance to Pakistan. We contracted it to Pakistan and Pakistan subcontracted it to groups that it picked.

How do you think it will play out now?

In post-Taliban Afghanistan, the Pakistani policy continued to be complex. On the one hand, they presented themselves as a friend of the U.S. — I attended many meetings between President Musharraf and President Bush. And they did a lot of things for us — airspace, bases, they arrested some people. Musharraf sent a message to the Taliban to deliver al-Qaeda though the ISI opposed it. But soon they began a second track — which was to allow sanctuaries for the Taliban and the Haqqani network. I was the first U.S. official who said Pakistan was developing sanctuaries for the Taliban and the Haqqanis. Some of my colleagues were not pleased. I made public statements so that our government noticed. I also wanted the Afghans to note that we were taking note of something that they were clearly seeing. The alliance that we were making with Afghans would be at risk unless we said it. Some people at high levels did not believe it. Musharraf was our friend and had good relations with Colin Powell [former Secretary of State]. They did not believe that he could send people to kill Americans. I did not invent these things. I had the same material that they were seeing. Intelligence. It took a while for the U.S. to understand the double game that Pakistan was playing. Once I was mentioning this to President Bush. He called Musharraf and said I had great concern about what was going on in Pakistan, and said I would go and give him the details. The President would not believe that Musharraf knew these things. I thought it was unlikely that Musharraf did not know. Though we did not have intelligence that he sat in this meeting and approved anything, that was our failure and not because he has not done it, I argued. This is a General, I said. It is unlikely, I dare say, impossible, that he does not know. From his territory, attacks were being carried out. So I went there and met President Musharraf. He denied that there was any Taliban in Pakistan. He said, “Show me their addresses; give me their phone numbers.” So I thought that the meeting was a waste of time. You could never get to their calculations. What they said indirectly was that the Indians were close to the Northern Alliance and they were influential in the government; the Indian consulates were selling arms or giving arms to the opposition, and so on.

Can there be equilibrium in the region in the near future?

U.S. policy has not found a formula to take all these equations involving India, Pakistan and Afghanistan and come up with an equilibrium that is workable in the region. Afghanistan is to some extent a victim — they have some responsibility but largely they have been at the receiving end of the calculations of others. Pakistan’s hostility towards Afghanistan has been there since the creation of Pakistan. Afghanistan was the only country that voted against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations. It was this dispute over the border that created the circumstances that pushed the Afghans to the Soviets. They wanted to seek friendly relations with the U.S. The U.S. insisted that Afghanistan accept the border with Pakistan. Afghanistan accepted Soviet help. So, what is the equilibrium that could work? Some settlement between Indian and Pakistan on Kashmir. I don’t know what will help Pakistan overcome the psychological barrier that India still threatens it. Pakistan has imperial constructs of its own. Being a nuclear power, it perhaps wants to lead an empire into Afghanistan and Central Asia. Some equilibrium could be arrived at. But it will take a while.

You hosted Donald Trump’s foreign policy speech. How do you see his narrative of Muslims and his vision about America’s relations with the Muslim world?

I think America is perfectly entitled to — and I support it as an American — not allow people that they don’t know enough about, and those who could pose a security threat. Sure, security of your own country is your primary responsibility. But I think it will be a mistake to say that Muslims are all suspects. That is wrong, number one. It is not only morally wrong, but also factually wrong. I am a Muslim and I had the highest clearances. I was Ambassador in war zones, had access to military, intelligence. No one can say I was disloyal to America. It does not serve America’s purpose to put 1.6 billion people as if they are all one, that they all believe the same thing and they are all equally hostile to America. There are various struggles within the Muslim world on what it means to be a Muslim in the modern world. America is made up of people from all over the world and it has been a melting pot. It should tighten its immigration — and I support it — putting emphasis on security and attracting the best and the brightest. I favour that immigration reform. I think it is counterproductive to put everyone in the same category.

Will you join a future Trump team?

I owe America a lot. I came from a remote part of Afghanistan, and I never could have imagined what I have become here. I care about America and America’s role in the world, American interests and American values. Therefore, I will do what I can do to help America. If Mr. Trump became President and he wanted or needed my help to follow a prudent strategy, sure I would help. America First is not isolationism, it is about the universality of American values.

varghese.g@thehindu.co.in

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