The exit polls are out in Bihar, and we are none the wiser. It is seemingly a photo finish between the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and the JD(U)-RJD-Congress Grand Alliance. The Bihar election is ending as it began, full of theatre and intrigue. We can only guess how it ends.
We were making our way to East Champaran; we didn’t realise Narendra Modi’s rally would be in Gopalganj district that day. The massive rally was over, but traffic had stopped moving 2 km from the rally site. The real reason for the traffic bottleneck then became clear. The road had narrowed to a single lane. While we headed further into Bihar, bus after bus, each with an Uttar Pradesh license plate, was headed the other way. We analysts often mistakenly use rallies to gauge the hawa for a party. But, ultimately, rallies are about theatre and spectacle, while elections are won on the strength of the ground-level campaign. Privately, a section of the BJP workers have been telling us that they can now see the NDA losing in this election. It is clear the Grand Alliance has run a stronger campaign than the NDA, which now seems unlikely to get near the 172 Assembly constituency segments it won in 2014. In the remainder of this piece, we describe the functioning of the Grand Alliance and how the NDA has responded.
Understanding the Grand Alliance
When once bitter enemies Nitish Kumar and Lalu Prasad, and their respective parties, the JD(U) and the RJD, formed a pre-electoral coalition, most (including us) were sceptical that it could work. The effectiveness of the Grand Alliance demonstrates the sheer malleability of caste coalitions in Indian politics; it also demands a closer look at how the coalition was able to function.
Lalu’s appeal
Early in the campaign, the NDA sought to paint Mr. Prasad’s tenure as Chief Minister as a “jungle raj”, leading to a breakdown of law and order and stifling economic development. In the 1990s, India was growing; however, data from the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP) shows that per capita incomes in Bihar actually declined from Rs. 1, 197 in 1990-91 to Rs. 1,093 in 1997-98. From the outside, given his record on economic development, Mr. Prasad’s support can seem puzzling.
Mr. Prasad developed leaders that came from marginalised communities, who spoke and looked like these populations (what is often called descriptive representation). At Mr. Prasad’s rally in Darbhanga, we spoke to a neatly dressed middle-aged man, now with an office job, from the scheduled caste Paswan community. He told us simply, “We were in the jungle; Lalu released us from that jungle.”
At one grocery stand in Siwan district, we found two young Muslim shopkeepers who spoke of the dignity Mr. Prasad brought to marginalised communities and justified the breakdown in law and order, stating, “If a population has been exploited for 100 years, of course there will be violence when they come to power suddenly.” At the same time, they had grown disenchanted with Mr. Prasad, arguing that Mr. Kumar had opened their eyes to the vikas that was possible in Bihar.
The Logic of the JD(U)-RJD Alliance
Mr. Prasad has electoral support across the most disadvantaged sections of society, and he is still admired even among those who no longer electorally support him. Mr. Prasad’s brand of politics generates an emotional connection to voters, and his voters tend to have a strong bond to him instead of “floating”.
While Mr. Prasad and the RJD still have a sizeable vote share, it has decreased in State elections. In its heyday, the RJD received 28 per cent of the vote share, in both 1995 and 2000.
In the two elections in 2005, it received 25 per cent and 23 per cent, and its vote share had dropped to 19 per cent in 2010 (In the 2014 national election, it received 20 per cent). By itself, or with weak coalition partners, it is unlikely that the RJD can win an election now.
Even in 2010, with a huge victory in partnership with the BJP, the JD(U)’s vote share was 23 per cent. In the 2014 national election, when the JD(U) decided to go it alone, it received only 16 per cent of the vote share. Without the addition of Mr. Prasad’s fixed vote, the JD(U) would have little chance to defeat the BJP (In 2014, the BJP’s vote share had surged to 29 per cent). The logic of the Grand Alliance has always been to add Mr. Prasad’s fixed vote with Mr. Kumar’s appeal among “floating voters”. The JD(U)’s decision to name Mr. Kumar as the Chief Ministerial candidate was aimed at attracting floating voters concerned about Mr. Prasad’s influence in the Grand Alliance.
Assessing the campaigns
In close undecided elections, as in this one, the optimal strategy is to convince floating voters on the margin to put one’s party/coalition over the top. In the previous piece, we opined that vikas was the issue that is most likely to attract floating voters. Had the NDA been able to stay on message in terms of vikas , instead of getting sidetracked with beef and reservations, it would likely have won this election easily. As it stands, Nitish’s credentials for development remained almost unchallenged by the NDA, and this may turn out to be the deciding factor in the election.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the campaign was the extent to which the JD(U) and the RJD was able to coordinate its voters. By contrast, at times, vote transferring was a problem for the NDA, as evidenced by the Lok Janshakti Party (LJP) supremo Ram Vilas Paswan’s outburst in Bochaha constituency against BJP karyakarta s. The NDA campaign’s decision to give more face time to local leaders and other coalition partners was aimed at fostering greater vote coordination, and it remains to be seen whether this worked.
In our >previous piece , we demonstrated that the NDA was moving to strongholds in phase 3 and 4, and they seem to have done better in these phases. We also toured extensively around constituencies that went to the polls in phase 5. Even in 2014, the NDA won only 15 out of 57 constituencies in this phase. In an election this close, if Hindu consolidation, which the BJP has tried to manufacture, can even slightly add to this number, it may be enough to tip the scales to the NDA.
Concluding thoughts
The election is simply too close to call. Soon, we will know the actual results in Bihar, and the exit polls won’t matter anymore. But the questions answered during the election will reverberate throughout Indian politics. Will voters punish the NDA for failing to stick to vikas throughout its campaign? Can the NDA continue the strategy of projecting Mr. Modi from the centre to win elections without naming a State-level face? Is this the election in which parties stop thinking in terms of simple caste calculus and more about development? We’ll know the answers soon enough.
(Neelanjan Sircar, Bhanu Joshi and Ashish Ranjan are all affiliated with the Centre for Policy Research in Delhi. This is the third article in a four-part series analysing the electoral situation in Bihar.)
