Borders vulnerable beyond J&K

Punjab is the camphor needed to reignite the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir, as also to enlarge the arc of terrorist violence within the country.

August 01, 2015 01:14 am | Updated April 01, 2016 04:23 pm IST

The >terror attack, on Monday, July 27 , by a three-member cross-border fidayeen unit on the Dinanagar police station in Gurdaspur district, Punjab, has reignited concerns about the revival of terrorism in the Punjab region, after the Khalistan movement had been effectively put down in the 1990s. There are heightened concerns, as Jammu and Kashmir is again witnessing a spike in militancy, after years of declining levels of violence. This has raised the spectre of a possible linkage between Khalistani terrorists and jihadi outfits, previously attempted but without success. Instead, as militancy in Jammu and Kashmir intensified in the 1990s, levels of violence in Punjab began to decline.

M.K. Narayanan

The concerns are genuine as both militant groups pay obeisance to a common master viz ., Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The latter, notwithstanding the occasional shifts and changes seen when a civilian government is in power in Islamabad, remains undeterred in its policy of “weakening India through a thousand cuts”.

ISI’s pivotal role Hence, this attack outside Jammu and Kashmir is a wake-up call for India. Several months of relative peace from terrorist attacks appear to have lulled both the government and the security apparatus into a sense of complacency, subsumed in the belief that the rhetoric and aggressive mien of the new government would act as a deterrent to provocations from Pakistan. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The ISI construct is essentially that of deviating from the “theory of compellence” of economist Thomas Schelling, and involves initiating actions, irrespective of the consequences of such actions. Therefore, peace moves and dialogues will not constrain the ISI. Rather, it would encourage further provocations. Hence, calling off National Security Advisor (NSA)-level talks would hardly matter in so far as the ISI is concerned.

The ISI holds the key to any change in Pakistan’s attitude towards the conduct of relations with India. However, there is no evidence whatsoever of a change in the ISI’s thought process. Rather, the organisation seems to be further hardening its approach, encouraged by the statements of Pakistan’s Army Chief of Staff, General Raheel Sharif, that Kashmir is “the unfinished business of Partition”, and the Lashkar-e-Taiba chief, Hafiz Sayeed’s call for an “all out war” against India.

This hardening is clearly manifest even during international security conferences. At such events, ISI representatives have become still more critical about India, following the advent of a new, so-called right-wing government. At these events, ISI representatives do not feel constrained in projecting India as an inveterate enemy of Pakistan, and of the need to counter this. This well implies the adoption of a more “activist approach” on the part of the ISI and Pakistan.

Exploiting strategic confusion Consequently, speculation that the ISI is working behind the scenes to actively foster close links and cooperation between jihadi militants and Khalistani elements cannot be disregarded. As it is, there is confirmed intelligence of increasing cooperation and coordination among Sikh radical groups abroad, specially in Europe and the United States. There is also intelligence about their growing “tilt” towards joining hands with other anti-India elements, especially Kashmiri militants. The Babbar Khalsa, the Khalistan Liberation Front and the Khalistan Tiger Force already have links with Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Taiba.

The ISI is also known to have undertaken the training of some of the Khalistani foot soldiers, in addition to training and equipping Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad cadres and those belonging to other pro-Pakistani terrorist outfits. This apart, the ISI seems intent on exploiting what it perceives as an element of “strategic confusion” that prevails in India on what is the right approach to be taken towards Pakistan.

Importance of Punjab Punjab is the camphor needed to reignite the “ jihad ” in Jammu and Kashmir, as also to enlarge the arc of terrorist violence within the country. The modus operandi — terrorists dressed in military fatigues, exploiting chinks in the international border (as “distinct from the Cease Fire Line”/Line of Control) in Jammu and Kashmir and now in the Punjab, the use of the Global Positioning System and modern gadgets to attack preselected targets including police stations, security installations and high profile targets, all carry the hallmark of planned and properly calibrated actions drawn up by counter intelligence specialists belonging to the ISI.

The new twist lies is exploiting “vulnerabilities” such as the poor state of Punjab’s defences — weakened by an administration hobbled by financial stringency and poor leadership, and “softened” by the drug menace — and the opportunities perceived to exist of exploiting polarising communal issues. The timing is significant, for, notwithstanding the relative peace that India has been enjoying for the past year and more, the overall security environment has changed for the worse in this period. The situation has become more complex and diverse. It involves far more than a mere nexus between terrorists and the ISI, and the significant influence of the Taliban in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Hence, dealing with this will need a great deal of heart-searching, on what can and needs to be done. It would entail a drastic overhaul of the existing security system. In addition, it would call for a major change in approach on the part of the political leadership and those in-charge of the intelligence and security establishment. The main imperative should be to significantly upgrade the ability of intelligence agencies and security forces to detect, disrupt and destroy sources of threat ahead of any such action on their part. In short, we need a system with multi-level indication and warning windows, accompanied by considerable support from members of the community — in short a citizen intelligence network.

Facing the threat It would be important for the more vulnerable States, specially the border States, to establish a counter terrorism grid to deal with a range of threats. Intrinsic to this, would be enhancing the capabilities of intelligence agencies — specially at the State level — regarding Human Intelligence (HUMINT). This would mean increasing the number of “operatives” in sensitive areas, and better training for them to achieve better and deeper penetration of the target groups. The more vulnerable States should establish a dedicated Centre for Counter-Terrorism, capable of both defensive and offensive counter-terrorist operations.

Better knowledge of technology is important to enable counter-terrorist agencies to deal with the growing complexity of communication methodologies being exploited by terrorist groups. The digital world has been both a positive and a negative factor and it is important that counter-terrorist agencies remain ahead of the curve, to deal with the current crop of terrorists. This will include interception and monitoring of communications and analysis of metadata.

Agencies will simultaneously need to enhance their analysis and assessment capabilities. Apart from the multi-agency centre in Delhi and the subsidiary multi-agency centres at the State level (both of which may need to be given a fresh look), States that face a major terrorist threat should experiment with the setting up of collation centres at the district level, and a fusion centre at the State level to coordinate all available information.

Border security has become critically important. The system that exists on the Jammu and Kashmir border — including the concept of an intelligence grid — needs to be extended to the other border States like Punjab and Rajasthan. Jammu and Kashmir has a three-tier system in place, and while it is not foolproof and may need further strengthening, Jammu and Kashmir is far better protected than other border States. Instead of being relegated to merely dealing with infiltration, border guarding forces also need to be involved to a greater degree in the effort to garner ground level intelligence. This will provide greater defence in depth. Police stations, not only in the border areas but also in the hinterland, should be suitably mobilised and their capacities enlarged, since they, in a sense, provide intelligence and vigil at the bottom of the pyramid.

(M.K. Narayanan is a former National Security Advisor and a former Governor of West Bengal.)

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