Fighting the insurgency will need careful planning and sustained innovation. But New Delhi seems to have only big sacks of cash and even bigger words.
Eleven weeks after the annihilation of an entire company of the Central Reserve Police Force in a Maoist ambush in April 2010 near the village of Tarmetla — the largest single loss India has ever suffered in a counter-insurgency campaign — Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram had fighting words for the consultative committee which exercises parliamentary oversight of his Ministry.
Mr. Chidambaram said the Chief Ministers of the four States worst hit by Maoist violence — Chhattisgarh, Orissa, West Bengal and Jharkhand — had agreed to set up a unified command centre for joint operations. The Centre would help strengthen the police infrastructure and provide helicopters. The Planning Commission's Member-Secretary would head an Empowered Group to monitor development projects in the most affected areas, thus draining the swamps of backwardness in which the Maoists thrived. “The government is confident,” he concluded, “that the problem of Left wing extremism will be overcome in the next three years.”
Nothing that has happened since Mr. Chidambaram's July 2010 address gives reason to believe his assertion. India's Maoist insurgency has become progressively more lethal: last year, the MHA says, 1003 people were killed, up from 908 in 2009 and 721 in 2008.
Last year, the MHA observed in its annual report that “the overall counter-action by the affected States in terms of Left-Wing Extremists killed, arrested and surrendered has shown much better results.” This time round, the annual report has held out no similar words of reassurance — and with good reason. Even though Mr. Chidambaram's war has all but disappeared off our television screens, the evidence shows it has run into big trouble.
For reasons that aren't entirely clear, the MHA does not provide breakdowns of the fatalities it records. However, an independent database maintained by the New Delhi-based Institute for Conflict Management (ICM) reveals a disturbing reality: despite massive investments in new forces and equipment, fewer insurgents are being eliminated while more police and civilians are being killed.
In 2007, 294 Maoists were recorded killed in police action; last year, the number was down to 170 — the lowest since the United Progressive Alliance government took power. However, the killings of both civilians and security forces have grown. In 2005, 150 police and 281 civilians were killed; last year, the numbers were 277 and 626.
Fatalities are not, in themselves, evidence of failure or success in combat: the early phases of counter-insurgency campaigns often witness sharp escalations in violence, as security forces push into regions where their adversaries held unchallenged power. The numbers from the ICM database, however, show that the ratio of insurgents to police killed is declining — which means the insurgents retain their edge.
In the autumn of 2009, Mr. Chidambaram initiated a sweeping offensive against Maoists: tens of thousands of personnel were mobilised in an effort to displace the insurgents from their strongholds. G.K. Pillai, former Home Secretary, announced that he hoped that “within 30 days of the security forces moving in and dominating the area, we should be able to restore civil administration.”
In the year-plus since, that hope has shattered. Finding themselves lacking the combat skills and intelligence needed to outmanoeuvre insurgent units in the forests — a lesson hammered home by the killings at Tarmetla — the Central forces have been doing little other than protecting their camps.
Chasing a chimera
Experts predicted just this outcome. Even as the media applauded the anti-Maoist offensive, the former Director-General of Punjab Police, K.P.S. Gill, warned that New Delhi was chasing a chimera. There was, he noted, a pattern: “months of State denial, appeasement and progressive error; paralysis in the face of rising Maoist violence; and the final, almost effortless, resolution as the rebels simply melted away in the face of the first evidence of determined use of force.”
The ICM's Ajai Sahni, in turn, prophesied that the retreat of Maoist groups would offer “no more than scant and fleeting comfort.” The strategic reality, he noted in a November 2009 article, was that “if there is a concentration of State forces on particular nodes, the Maoists will disperse and intensify operations in other areas; if there is a dispersal of State forces, these will be subjected to persistent and corrosive attacks at their points of vulnerability.”
India's Mughal-era mode of counterinsurgency, consisting of despatching large numbers of forces to contain distant rebellions, had led to protracted stalemates in several States, the experts noted — and the Maoist campaign would prove no different.
New Delhi didn't listen — and has since continued to demonstrate a remarkable unwillingness to learn from experience. Each successive annual report of the MHA has underlined the need for a holistic response to the insurgency — but has never devoted a word to why multi-million rupee investments in schools, roads or hospitals have yielded so few results.
In 2008, the MHA advised violence-affected States to push forward with a nine-point programme that included “time-bound action for augmenting the police force,” development of “suitable incentives for persons who are posted in these areas,” putting up “secure police station buildings,” setting up units “with special commando/jungle warfare related training,” ensuring that public services were “available and accessible to people” and creating “mechanisms for public grievance redress.”
These same points, in exactly the same words, have figured unchanged in annual reports since — for example, in paragraph 2.7.7 of the annual report for 2009-2010, and paragraph 2.7.9 in 2010-2011.
Even the most obtuse bureaucrat ought to have realised that the repeated use of copy and paste commands on his word processor wasn't likely to make a policy work. However, funds continued to be spent on building non-functional schools and highways that existed only on paper. Even a bridge across the Godavari to link the economic hub at Karimnagar to Bhopalpattinam, which Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh agreed to build in 2007, is yet to be constructed.
The writing on the wall has become painfully clear: without order, development is just not possible and New Delhi has no coherent strategy to bring about this precondition for progress.
Reimagining strategies
MHA strategists have, in the main, dealt with the problem by escalating it up the bureaucratic ladder. Mr. Chidambaram's 2010 inter-State committee was just the latest in a series of similar bodies charged with implementing development. In 2007, the MHA set up a Naxal Management Division under the command of an Additional Secretary to ensure “periodic review and close monitoring of the Action Plans drawn up by the States.”
Later, in February 2008, the Cabinet Secretary began chairing meetings to coordinate responses to the Maoists.
As Dr. Sahni noted sardonically, it would have been no small achievement “if the State could even ‘restore civil administration' to vast expanses of rural India where the Maoists have no presence whatsoever, but where virtually the entire apparatus of governance has vanished — at least some of these areas are little more than a stone's throw away from Delhi.”
Last year, after the Tarmetla massacre, Mr. Chidambaram urged Indians to “remain calm, hold our nerve, and do not stray from the carefully chosen course that we have adopted since November 2009.” The time has come for New Delhi to consider whether that chosen course is, in fact, a useful one.
Premised on the belief that counter-insurgency campaigns must be population-centric — in other words, dominate territories and thus deny insurgents contact with the population — the strategic foundation of India's war on Maoist insurgents has proved to be flawed. There are, quite simply, just not enough troops to secure the continental scale of the terrain involved.
Insurgents have known for centuries that superior forces can be defeated. Napoleon Bonaparte believed his 1808 occupation of Spain would be a “military promenade.” Instead, France found itself bogged down by a protracted guerrilla struggle that lasted six years and compelled the commitment of three-fifths of its imperial army. The Irish insurgents who fought the British in 1848 were taught to “decompose the science and system of war.” “The force of England,” advised the radical James Lalor, “is entrenched and fortified. You must draw it out of position; break up its mass; break its trained line of march and manoeuvre; its equal step and serried array.”
In 266 BC, the chronicles of the ancient historian Aelian recorded, emperor Antigonus II Gontas laid siege to the city of Megara. The Megarans had no weapons with which to break the ranks of Antigonus II's battle elephants. No weapons, that is, bar their wits — and Megara's pigs, which were rounded up, doused with resin, and set on fire. The squealing animals ran in flames towards the elephants, which panicked and fled killing many of the emperor's troops.
India's battle elephants, too, have failed to uproot the red flag from the large swathes of central India where the Maoist insurgency has embedded itself. Insurgencies are small commanders' wars: wars that depend on the training, commitment and skills of leaders on the ground, not armies of conventional scales and resources. Fighting the Maoist insurgency will need careful planning and sustained innovation. New Delhi seems to have, in its arsenal, only big sacks of cash and even bigger words.
Articles like this are an eaxmlpe of quick, helpful answers.
The Naxal problem must be seen in a new perspective. As the few parts of the country are developing fast but at the same time remote rural areas are stagnant as earlier. The media has accentuated thier aspirations as well but the prevailing system failed to deliver. So countering violence with violence is no solution.Govt needs to act to bring them in the mainstream of development.
: It has become routine for the Union Home Minister or concerned chief Minister of the state to condemn the attacks of terrorists/Naxal/insurgents. Coming out with assurances to crush them.Except making this kind of utterances nothing concrete action is coming up.There is a wide gap between the policies and its implementation.Centre tries to escape stating that L&O is state subject.The state governments who make large statements/claims, do little at ground level.Despite knowing the naxal problem is socio-economic, simply thrusting on the police no other measures taken.The higher ups in police too who occupy top positions never press the state to resolve the problem. They will be appeasing state or centre to get extension of service or to get political posts.Even at ground level many loop holes are seen.The forces are not trained in jungle war, not given night vision goggles,no updated communication sets,weapons,vehicles etc. In the name of checks on expenditure fuel is curtailed.
The article talks about the failiue of the MHA. However, the problem has been the lack of a unified command to take on the Maoists. Politically also, Congress leaders like Digvijay singh talk about political solutions. What is needed first is to decide whether the problem is a political problem (which means you negotiate) or a law and order problem. It is probably something in between but the approach must be caliberated and take on board all state govts. The present situation shows failiure on all fronts.
Dealing with asymmetric violences requires altogether diffrent strategies than those followed in conventional warfare. This while coupled with adequate police to population ratio alongwith proper planning and sustained innovation. Though we saw some efforts on the part of government which culminated in the formation of Unified command in four states to fight Naxal menace, but the implementation of these strategies is far cry from what was expected. Moreover, the intelligence network of our forces leaves a lot of scope for improvement. There is requirement for opening up of more Institutes like Counter insurgency & Jungle warfare school(Mizoram). Government's two pronged strategy to deal with the menace holistically seems to be plausible but it requires to be made operational in the ground and coupled with effective monitoring. Recent efforts of some state governments like creation of Pseudo-temorary-ill paid- inadequately trained forces are hardly any answer to the grave problem.
I wonder if the present government was at all serious about Government control in that area.If they were interested then their presence would have been seen in the form of Helicopter bases manned by services every fifty kilometres and they will have hospitals, subsidised department stores, a high school, service personnel including police of over 100 men and women.It takes time to establish these but they have had enough time to show that they couldnt care less.In three years the Congress would have won the elections hands down.Unfortunately they seem to want something else .I neednt predict- time will tell the people the result.
This article is one sided. The author clearly lacks any historical perspective. Maoist movement has grown over the years despite all attempts to destroy it by successive Indian governments. I hear from India's so called 'free media' only one mantra -- Maoists are terroist, extremist etc. etc. I have personal knowledge of tribal people of India. To them, Indian State is the face of terror. Whatever money that Delhi allocates gets pilfered by our leaders. So, ironically, Maoist movement does benefit political leaders, The Indian Police is probably the worst of all. No wonder the tribals are supporting the Maoist, not because they are 'often good' but 'simply better'.
Solution: A new social contract for the tribal people where they will be in charge of their economic resources and lives. However, that is not going to happen. Following their British masters, the Indian leaders will try to coopt some leaders from the Maoist movement without changing the underlying social dynamics.
The article indeed has diagnoised the problem aptly well and giving historical evidence suggested solution too. However, what is most lacking is Concern, Commitment & Accountability of our Home Ministers, Chief Ministers & Political parties to solve the problem. This type of killings and terrorism goes on unabatedly and those occupying position of powers are not worried at all. See how many persons are killed by Railway accidents and riots in addition to acts of terrorists each year giving an impression that country is least bothered when VVIPs and their families are secured by SPG cover.
Excellent article!Our Home minister has done nothing significant in handling Maoists or Terrorists.Rather than choosing a peaceful approach, a provocative course is choosen and the ultimate victims are inadequately trained jawans who lost their lives in the operations.Our politicians should take prudent decisions atleast now.
Let us go to the basics of Indian Politics. The functioning of a DEMOCRATIC government will go well only if the political party or parties at the helm of affairs follows DEMOCRATIC traditions. It is the failed DEMOCRATIC process clubbed with police repression which is pushing peoples towards Maoists politics. People know CPI (Maoist) is the only Democratic Party which adheres strict inner party DEMOCRATIC traditions to establish NEW DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION in our country. Without going through the root cause of the present day ills ie; our rotten DEMOCRATIC system which has gone beyond repair... It is business as usual like loot our people and our country and have more faith in Swiss banks.
The government's inability to get a handle on the true nature of the Maoist insurgency and the recent serial bombing in Mumbai have hurt Home Minister Chidambaram's reputation as an efficient and effective minister. He came in as the prospective saviour of the country from terrorists after the 26/11 attack. He had the media applauding him all the way. But the mood in the country has changed. He is under attack from all directions. His "I have all the answers" stance is not paying dividends. He has to seek answers for many pressing questions on the country's security and he will do that only if he is convinced that he doesn't have them yet.
The existence of BIG words and non existence of any perceptible action has become an everyday affair of the government. It spreads in all the sectors, all facets of the govt functioning and what exists to check it is the judiciary, which itself is not free from corruption. In the wake of these set backs and govt. non-committal attitude towards taking any concrete step to check it (for eg: bringing the PM and the judiciary under the ambit of the Lokpal)the citizenry feels helpless.
Reading stories in the newspapers day after day of corrupt politicians and unwillingness of the govt. and its hollow promises. Is there any meaning left to the word Democracy in the Indian scenario?
An excellent article. First, the UPA government is bogged down by corruption, from recruitment to higher levels. While corruption in other departments may translate to difficulty for common man, corruption in law enforcement agencies would only mean the debilitation of the state machinery. Unfortunately, needless to >mention, Indian Police service is perceived as the most corrupt. So, I seriously don't believe what to expect from a battalion with no brains (very little IQ) lead by some leaders who has it either. The UPA doesn't want independent IPS or Lokpal bill to maintain their autocracy. People like K.P.S. Gill, Kiran bedi, etc are people from an other era when the service was respected and regarded. Now the bright brains are comfortably settled abroad. I seriously don't believe, any gains over the Maoists could be made until the haunting mistakes of the GoI are corrected. At least make the Law Enforcement independent of politics & recruit as private companies do.
Knowing the way the police forces operate it does not at all come as a great surprise that it is unable to make any headway in the counter insurgency against Maoist extremists. There is hardly any improvement in the colonial mind set of the forces since British left the country. If any thing, it has deteriorated because of heavy political interference. For a common man the police is no more than an instrument of oppression. With the law enforcement by and large having abdicated its responsibility, it should not come as surprise that Maoists are thriving under the pretext of savior of the poor.
Home Minster will continue to whistle in the dark unless the government forces are trained in emotional intelligence,empathy, subtlety,sophistication, and political adroitness in meeting the Maoist challenge and move away from the use of brute force solutions.
Praveen\Hindu have painted one-side picture of eliminating naxal activities,spreading like wild fire in country because of exploitation of poor and tribal!Union and state governments will definitely suffer and naxal activities will be increased unless the government thinks over overhauling system - not strengthening forces to counter violence with violence.-but heavy dose of development. Naxal,poor and tribal have points to change system under democracy to counter age-old atrocities! Naxal are not against democracy but against prevailing system- A recent article in the Frontline "in their voice" has made startling revealations through 'Swara',a community radio service in which writer has informed how govt machineries with help of para-military forces are creating terror in Chhatishgarh and how these misdeeds came to light in national media, particularly Hindu about burning of houses of tribals and killing them rampantly also complaints against local officials? my blog-www.kksingh1.com
It is unfortunate that the sense of urgency which needs to be shown is lacking. The forces are not only at their wit's end to quell this insurgency but also resort to unlawful tactics like burning villages and chasing away the villagers every time they suspect them to be sympathisers of Naxalites. This makes them lose the much needed local sympathy and compounds the problems of the security forces who are then faced with a lack of any informers.The way forward would be to deal with the local people in a more sympathetic manner, strive for inclusion of these people in the growth story of India by helping them vocationally and instilling a sense of belonging amongst the local population. But it is a lot of hard work.Does someone have the gumption for it ?
Given the corruption in the Indian administration and political class, there would be vested interest in keeping the Maoist insurgency alive and well. In the name of insurgency haven't lot of people got shamelessly rich in the North-East? Apart from this, there is enough evidence around the world and in history that you cannot fight guerillas with conventional armies or technologies. The greatest evidence of this is that of Vietnam where the mighty US met it's nemesis. If you go deeper into history, Alexander proved that any army, howsoever mighty, can be defeated by a much smaller force which uses strategy, tactics and knowledge of terrain in battle. The best example of it was the defeat of the great Persian army of Darius numbering over 3,00,000, (some say 6L) with a force of under 40,000, not once but twice. These were the battles that got him the tag of 'Alexander the Great''.
Excellent article. A very thorough analysis of the present trend of counter insurgency operation and its efficacy.
The article puts the facts in perspective about the colored policy of the MHA without any changes in the actual processes or implementation for the Naxal problem. But any finger pointing needs to be supplemented with the proposed alternative solutions or strategies, without which, it is easy to conclude supporting the flawed policies on the reason that, there is no other alternative available. Just mentioning Development is an alternative will not be sufficient. It should be made into an implementable approach for the problem.
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