Given the sensitivity surrounding the atomic issue in Japan, Prime Minister Naoto Kan's decision to begin negotiations on a nuclear cooperation agreement with India is especially bold and forward-looking. Until recently, the working group on energy was considered the sole vehicle for exploring nuclear trade. Mindful of Japanese public sentiment, the Indian side has been careful not to be impatient. In October 2008, while on a visit to Tokyo, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said India would move at “a pace at which the Japanese people and government are comfortable,” when asked about the prospect of a bilateral nuclear agreement. Since then, Japan has had two changes of government. Taro Aso made way for Yukio Hatoyama after this year's landmark electoral victory of the Democratic Party of Japan, and he, in turn, has been replaced by Mr. Kan. If the question of bilateral nuclear trade has acquired a new urgency, it is because American and French companies, which hope to conclude major deals for the construction of reactors in India, need to source key components from Japanese firms like Mitsubishi Heavy. The commercial pressure from these companies apart, South Korea's decision to negotiate an agreement with India for the supply of reactors seems to have nudged Tokyo in the direction of relaxing its ‘no nuclear trade with Delhi' stance.
Apart from ironing out the technical aspects of any bilateral nuclear agreement, it is natural that Japan will want India to reiterate its non-proliferation commitments. Already, the Japanese pacifist lobbies have stepped up to the plate to caution the Kan government about providing nuclear equipment to a country that has not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty or even the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. India's position on both these treaties is clear enough: NPT membership is an impossibility; and though its attitude to the CTBT will depend on U.S. and Chinese accession, its test moratorium will remain firmly in place. Beyond these two issues, however, there is much that India and Japan share on the question of nuclear disarmament. India recently put forward an updated version of the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan, many of whose proposals can serve as intermediate steps towards the ultimate goal of a nuclear free world. While the discussions on nuclear commerce will necessarily be handled by the atomic establishments from both sides, the 2+2 secretary-level dialogue provides a useful platform for India and Japan to evolve common positions on the wider question of nuclear disarmament.
