There is nothing surprising about the Anglo-American decision to spend their way out of a hopeless war in Afghanistan by creating a fund to compensate defectors from the Taliban. In counter-insurgency, context is everything. Had the Taliban been on the verge of defeat on the battlefield, a few million dollars could well hasten the disintegration of its fighting formations. But given the nature of the conflict, the historical background, and the appalling scale of civilian casualties inflicted by the occupation, it is the Taliban who have been growing in strength, capability, and initiative. It is the U.S.-led coalition that is looking for a quick way out of a calamitous misadventure. Today, the binding constraint in the war against the Taliban is not the number of American troops or the lethality of their firepower but the capacity of the Afghan National Army and the willingness of Pakistan to tamp down and eliminate its ties with the extremist militias. The cash solution pushed through at the recent London conference on Afghanistan addresses neither of these constraints. Islamabad is likely to see the plan as another sign of Anglo-American desperation and as vindication of its strategy of keeping alive ‘assets’ like the Quetta shura of the Talibani and the Haqqani network leadership.
As for the Afghan National Army, its ranks already suffer from problems of low pay and morale. If extremists are now to be bought over with cash, the message it will send to army soldiers is that they chose the wrong side. This is not to say creative solutions are not needed to bring an end to the war. Dialogue and reconciliation are needed, although it is clear the Taliban leadership (and the al-Qaida elements, to the extent they are active on the ground in Afghanistan) is not interested in either. Rank-and-file fighters and even commanders are another kettle of fish but the danger is that the cash being ponied up to engineer defections might end up in the hands of the Taliban themselves. The equation would have been different had the offer of rehabilitation been made from a position of strength. There should of course be no illusion about the character of the Taliban: they remain as fundamentalist, as reactionary, and as brutal as they ever were. But as long as the U.S. and its allies wage and lead the war in Afghanistan, civilians will continue to be killed in large numbers and the Taliban support base will not erode. The occupation must end and, when that happens, there will be major consequences for the government and people of Afghanistan. But that scenario is unavoidable and must be faced sooner than later.
Keywords: Taliban, War on terror, Afghanistan
Comments:
Encouraging defactions from the Taliban offering the lure of money is sure to backfire as its a trade off between money and life. Anyone who opts to change sides will have to live the rest of their lives in the perpetual fear of being killed by the Taliban. Moreover, what is required is a wilful change of mind and not for the lure of money. If the support of Al-Qaeda is available to Taliban, then they too can spend money to retain their members.
The money so proposed to be spent should be used to increase the morale of the soldiers fighting the Taliban. As long as Taliban doesn't understand the meaning of words like peace, freedom, democracy etc. any money spend on luring their members out of the outfit is not going to deliver long term results.
Excellent & useful
Nowhere in the history a victorious party has shown white flag and called the vanquished for dialogue. It is the vanquished who is in a hurry to patch up and somehow escape the ignominy of being a loser. US is testing the water through Karzai. It is going to fail as it is not that easy to induce Taliban foot-soldiers. They will be very much afraid of the retaliation. The money they can get is not worth. In cases of some mafia squeakers and all US gives sufficient money and duplicate passport and such that the informer can dissappear completely. Here it is not the case. They have to live very much there itself and no man with an iota of brain will imagine that the Karzai regime will protect them.
The idea of softening the Taliban with the additional surge is also equally fruitless. With all the troops it had neither NATO or US could not do anything at all so far. This is not a conventional war and no troop increase is going to help.
In two years time when US and NATO leave the arena it will be once again the Taliban rule. But how long they can rule is to be seen. That area has never been a cohesive unit. It was and still is comprised of various tribes and clans and war lords who all are ready to fight for their fiefdom as soon as the things become normal. It is bound to split at least into two--Norhtern Afghanistan and Southern Pashtunistan.
In all probability Pakistan also will disentigrate like Yugoslavia after Marshal Tito's death. The dollars US is giving will dry up as soon as US's interest in the area wanes. It will be a chaotic situation in Pakistan and all the Pashtun dominated areas will go to Afghan Pashtun. A new Durand line will be drawn. Balochistan will also go away. Then only Punjab and Sind will remain in Pakistan.
The prospect of United States and the United Kingdom trying to buy their way out of the Afghan quagmire is a matter of grave concern. US and its allies learnt that quelling armed rebellion of Taliban and similar militia in Afghan is not an easy task. They have tried many tactics and found none to be effective.
The idea of waging a war in a foreign land to keep one's borders safe is a wrong one in the first place. The idea of buying out your opponents is even more weird. I think a fresh thinking is needed on how to combat the ideology of the Taliban or Al-Qaeda and war should not be the only option. Fighting fire with fire sounds good on paper but rarely works in reality.
The present situation is the result of war-mongers Bush-Blair and Co. Why is it that countries like India silent on this matter? When Iraq invaded Kuwait on whimsical grounds, US took upon itself to bring justice, and now when US followed the Iraq's footstep, no country is accusing the allies and fighting them is altogether un-imaginable. Can't we atleast diplomatically 'scold' these allies? From lanes to streets to cities to states to countries to continents, now one thing is very clear: the rule of the stronger is law and the weak has to suffer!
A scenario where Taliban is left uncontrolled (at least to some extent), is least welcome, not just for the U.S and U.K but for many others including India. In addition to money and gun-power, the Taliban would enjoy the luxury of political power too. Its influence would get stronger and the regression in the attitude against it is again going to lead to a situation when there would be a greater need to revert to the present or even to an unprecedented level of confrontation, which only increases the cost. So what should be done should be done now. Either the world countries should fight or give up and try to persuade the Taliban to talk.