The death of seven soldiers in the terrorist attack on an Army base in Nagrota provides graphic evidence of the high cost being borne by the armed forces amidst escalating violence in Jammu and Kashmir. The attack comes just two months after militants stormed an Army camp in Uri, resulting in the death of 19 soldiers. Early on Tuesday morning, three terrorists entered the camp in Nagrota, near Jammu city and not very far from the headquarters of 16 Corps, one of the largest and most important corps of the Indian Army. It is important to investigate how heavily armed terrorists reached the 166 Medium Regiment premises in a securitised area, despite several road blocks on the road to Nagrota. Wearing police uniforms, the terrorists reportedly scaled a wall and stormed the base, where many military families were staying. Seven soldiers, including two Majors, were killed as they fought to prevent a hostage situation. At least four unarmed officers, the wives of two officers and two children were among those who were at risk of being taken hostage. According to Army officers, the two women also showed exemplary presence of mind, and blocked their doors with household items.
With the latest incident, at least 89 security personnel have been killed in Jammu and Kashmir so far in 2016. This is the highest figure in almost a decade, or since the gains of the 2003 ceasefire on the India-Pakistan border began to be consolidated. Since the surgical strikes of September 29 in response to the Uri attack, India has lost 27 security personnel. In fact, the attrition rate among the security forces has been going up steadily vis-à-vis the terrorists. Decades of experience in fighting insurgencies and the diverse tactics adopted to reduce security force casualties have in recent months been challenged by the terrorists’ focus on security installations, aimed at causing maximum casualties among the forces. The violence level within Jammu and Kashmir is a result of several factors: the unrest in the Valley, the state of India’s relations with Pakistan, and the situation along the border, both the International Boundary and the Line of Control. On all three fronts, much needs to be done. India-Pakistan bilateral relations have nosedived in recent months. And while New Delhi does not have the luxury of choosing unilaterally between relative peace and a lingering state of low-intensity conflict, there needs to be an appraisal of the costs that have come with the breakdown of the 2003 ceasefire — for instance, crossfire is routinely a cover for Pakistan in assisting terrorists to cross over to Indian territory. Creating peace is a complex process. Drawing up a plan to minimise loss of life will be a good place to begin.
