On January 6, the Ambassador passed information from the Pakistani government regarding the Mumbai attacks to Home Minister Chidambaram and National Security Advisor Naryanan.

185827, 01/06/2009 08:41, 09NEWDELHI19, Embassy New Delhi, SECRET, 09NEWDELHI16|09 NEWDELHI17|09STATE314, "VZCZCXYZ0000OO RUEHWEBDE RUEHNE #0019 0060841ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 060841Z JAN 09FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHITO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4928INFO RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA IMMEDIATE 1816RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 5656RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATERUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATERHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATERHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATERUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATERUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATERUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE","S E C R E T NEW DELHI 000019 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2019 TAGS: PREL, PTER, PINR, PK, IN SUBJECT: HOME MINISTER CHIDAMBARAM AND NSA NARAYANAN ON INFORMATION SHARING ON MUMBAI TERROR ATTACKS REF: A. NEW DELHI 17 B. NEW DELHI 16 C. STATE 314(NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford.

Reasons: 1.4(B, D). 1. (S)

Summary: On January 6, the Ambassador passed information from the Pakistani government regarding the Mumbai attacks to Home Minister Chidambaram and National Security Advisor Naryanan. (Ref. C). Information will also be given to two other heads of intelligence bodies on the same restricted basis. Narayanan asked that any additional relevant information the U.S. had regarding the attacks be made available without pre-approval from the Pakistanis. Minister Chidambaram reiterated the importance of the U.S. being provided access to detained attacker Kasab's father to establish conclusively Kasab's citizenship in a fashion that would confirm Pakistan's good will to cooperate. End Summary.

Information from Pakistan Passed to GOI

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2. (S) In an early morning meeting on January 6 at Home Minister Chidambaram's residence, the Ambassador gave to Chidambaram and NSA Narayanan, who was also present, copies of the information referred to in Ref C. Sealed copies for the Prime Minister, External Affairs Minister and Defense Minister were also passed. The Ambassador explained the background and source of the material, stressed its significance, and characterized it as a step in the right direction. He told the two officials that the U.S. hoped such sharing would produce a positive response from the Indian government. The Ambassador noted that India's release of the dossier on its Mumbai investigation (ref A), could possibly have a negative impact on Pakistan's willingness to share information.

3. (S) Narayanan asked whether additional information that the U.S. had available regarding the Mumbai attacks could be made available where relevant to India without requesting additional permission from Pakistan. He said India needs to know the full story about the attack and argued that even a partial release of information would be useful. Narayanan and Chidambaram agreed that the information the U.S. had passed from Pakistani sources should also be shared on a similarly restricted basis with the Directors of the Research and Analysis Wing and the Intelligence Bureau.

Access to Pakistani Sources

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4. (S) Minister Chidambaram renewed his request for information on whether the U.S. had sent a FBI team to Islamabad and highlighted again the importance to India of the U.S. having access to detained attacker Kasab's father and of reporting basic information about the boat motor used in the attack. (Note: Legatt informed the Ambassador later that the FBI team has not been sent yet because they are presently interviewing another detainee in India who may have played a role in planning the Mumbai attacks.)

Comment

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5. (S) We concur with the Indian government that providing the U.S. access to Kasab's father would be a straightforward test of Pakistan's intentions to pursue a serious investigation of the attacks. Interviewing the father, taking a DNA sample from him, and allowing access to the villagers in Faridkot would be the easiest means of establishing conclusively (a) that Kasab is indeed a Pakistani in the apparent absence of available Pakistani records, and (b) that the government of Pakistan is willing to cooperate to pin down in a definitive manner a fact which seems not to be open to dispute. Pakistan's refusal to acknowledge publicly Kasab's citizenship while doing little privately to clear up any ambiguity about this issue looks increasingly to the Indians like an official cover-up and indicates a lack of good will in pursuing the investigation.

MULFORD "