The spending of the national rural employment guarantee scheme in the erstwhile unified state of Andhra Pradesh was likely influenced by the voting pattern in particular mandals, a study said.
The study revealed that those areas that did not vote for the UPA coalition in 2004, but did so in 2009 were “rewarded” with MGNREGS spending after the 2009 election. This implied that the UPA coalition considered changes in voting patterns over time while making decisions about fund allocation and spending.
The study ‘Preferential Resource Spending under an employment guarantee — The political economy of MGNREGS in Andhra Pradesh’ released by the World Bank presents an interesting case of the influence of politics on the implementation of the scheme. It, however, claimed that establishing a relationship between the safeguards or institutions embedded within MGNREGS and the political manipulation of the program would be an incredibly difficult, if not impossible, task.
Politically motivated
Interestingly, the study said it did not find evidence that political leaning of a mandal before the 2009 election influenced MGNREGS expenditure levels. But, it did find consistent evidence (although with an effect small in magnitude) that the distribution of funds after the election was partially politically motivated, either to reward their loyal constituencies for their successful 2009 election or to encourage further support in the 2014 election.
The study pointed out to the heavily “top down” approach adopted for the implementation of the MGNREGS in Andhra Pradesh despite the “bottom up” manner originally conceived by the Act. The implementation of the MGNREGS had often been flush with directives from the state government on the prioritization of works.
Undermining panchayats
The programme is being implemented at the village level by hired field assistants, not locally elected leaders, undermining the power envisioned of the gram panchayat. The state government, which employs and manages the field assistants, can exert direct control on the implementation process through these individuals.
“The fact that directives frequently come from higher level of Government raises obvious questions about how MGNREGS can be influenced by political motivations at these levels undermining the very spirit of an employment guarantee programme,” the study said.
Rewards
The findings, by taking mandal as a unit, revealed that those areas that voted for the UPA in 2004, but not in 2009, were “punished” in that they received less funds. The study divided the mandals into four categories — win-win mandals including those mandals that elected the UPA coalition both in 2004, 2009, lose-win mandals (mandals where UPA lost in 2004, but won in 2009), win-lose mandals (mandals where UPA won in 2004, but lost in 2009) and lose-lose mandals where the UPA lost in both the elections.
“Indeed, the results of tests suggest that both the groups that did not vote for UPA in 2009 (lose-lose and win-lose) were “punished” with less funds. We also find that those mandals that consistently did not vote for UPA (lose-lose) received significantly less funds than the group that switched from non-UPA supporters in 2004 to supporters in 2009 (lose-win).
The previously non-UPA mandals that moved towards the UPA in 2009 (lose-win) were no more or less likely to receive more funds than those mandals that were consistent supporters (win-win),” the study said.
