The aftermath of a terror attack on Indian soil predictable: pointers to the complicity of Pakistan, rhetoric about how we should handle our problematic western neighbour with force, demands for economic and cultural sanctions, and so on. But the days after the Uri attacks saw a dramatic departure from the well-worn script.
The boycott of the forthcoming SAARC conference was followed, on Thursday, by news that the Indian military had carried out a series of ‘surgical strikes’ across the Line of Control. This was a serious departure from India’s policy of strategic restraint, putting us in uncharted territory. Now, after years of stasis, a new set of consequences and outcomes are now up for debate.
It was almost prescient, then, that The Hindu on Thursday met with Toby Dalton, one of the authors of a new book, Not War, Not Peace (Oxford University Press), that addresses the question of what Indian can do to motivate Pakistan to do more to prevent such attacks. Mr. Dalton is co-director of the nuclear policy programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and his co-author George Perkovich is vice-president for studies at the same organisation. Their book is based on a series of interviews with serving and retired officials from both India and Pakistan, through which they seek to analyse the implications of possible Indian policies and capabilities to deter and to respond to another major terror attack.
There are no theories in existing international relations literature that offer an guidelines on how to deal with the Inida-Pakistan issues, Mr Dalton says. “Much of the literature is written by western theorists about the Soviet Union and America […] both very large states that are geographically separated, both having nuclear weapons, but directing their conflict in areas that were unlikely to lead to direct confrontation. Nothing in that literature informs us about how we should think about terrorism or non-state actors as a potential catalyst for conflict. Conversely, most of the literature about dealing with terrorism doesn’t imagine states with nuclear weapons and how that affects counter-terrorism strategy. On top of that, here you have two states that border each other and have images of each other — particularly in Pakistan — where the they think of the neighbour as an existential threat. This is just a unique, difficult situation in which to think about ways to bring stability such that neither state is seeking through violence or other means to destablise the other.”
Through their conversations on both sides, Mr. Dalton says, he and Mr. Perkovich have tried to reflect on and work through the logic and the capabilities on the table. “What we find in many cases is that there is a real tension between actions that would have a symbolic and punitive effect but no long term effect on the problem, versus actions that might have some strategic effect but are also very risky in terms of the potential for escalation of conflict. ” By the same token, he argues, just seeking peace without the ability to coerce doesn’t seem likely. In his estimation, it is a combination of factors, such as having a stronger defensive capability, and a policy on Kashmir that makes it harder for Pakistan — in an attempt to internationalise the problem — to point to what India is doing there. “There has to be a balance between having coercive options and but also finding ways to mobilise international opinion and changing opinion within Pakistan with regard to the state supporting terror strikes. It’s the combination that might provide the motivation, any one of them alone is insufficient.”
Pointing to unsubstantiated news reports last week that Indian commandos crossed into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and killed 20 terrorists, Mr. Dalton asks, “What would be the long-term consequences of an action like that? It might satisfy the desire for punishment of terrorists, and it might actually affect the capability of a particular group, but it doesn’t fundamentally change things in terms of motivating Pakistan. What we’re suggesting is that if you want to find means of motivation, many of those have to come from economic and diplomatic measures and those involving civil society. Putting out only coercive options come with the risk of escalation, and they also don’t help build and sustain a narrative in Pakistan that challenges encouragement of non-state groups that attack India.” (Just a few hours after our conversation, the surgical strikes were confirmed.)
Mr. Dalton hopes the book is read by people responsible for policy in India, and that it will help them them think about this problem in a more structured way, in particular, looking beyond the immediate desire for punishment and to have a framework to talk through the consequences of certain actions. “A lot of what is in the book are not new ideas but just a place where they can all be collected. To the extent that the academics and experts community and journalists and others also spend a lot of time after events like the Uri attack thinking and talking about what to do, perhaps this analysis can help in those discussions too.”
There has to be a balance between having coercive options and finding ways to mobilise international opinion and changing opinion within Pakistan
Toby Dalton
