We now have a growing literature on India’s security and foreign policy concerns. But the present volume, a product of collaboration between Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (Delhi) and Institute for Defence Studies (Oslo) and edited by three leading scholars of international politics, perhaps for the first time brings together contributions on grand strategy in Indian history, modern ideological roots of India’s grand strategy and the practice of India’s grand strategy in selected areas of world politics. The result is a holistic presentation of the problematic of India’s grand strategy.
The volume’s first three essays uncover the historical legacy of ‘Indian grand strategic thought and practice’. Using the epics Ramayana and Mahabharata, Swarna Rajagopalan argues that ancient India’s dividing political line was dharma (order) and adharma (chaos), rather than ideas of national and cultural identities. She relates the lack of an articulated and carefully pursued grand strategy in contemporary India to the ancient Indian maxim that rulers were required to be driven by principles which were ‘context dependent’ and not ‘absolute in application’.
Jayashree Vivekanandan finds in Mughal strategic discourse, especially during Akbar’s reign, a synthesis between expansion and accommodation. While pursing imperial expansion, Akbar adopted such accommodative measures as the mansabdari system, inculcation of an inclusive spiritual belief-system and dissemination of paternalistic loyalty around himself. For Vivekanandan, Indian state’s ‘accommodative strategies’ in meeting external and internal threats is a reflection of Akbar’s statecraft.
In his perceptive essay Srinath Raghavan underlines the significance of the discourse of Indian liberals in the evolution of Indian ‘strategic thought and practice’. He particularly focuses on the liberal advocacy for Indianisation of the Indian army and establishment of civilian control over the military establishment. Both these ideas remain crucial in India’s nation-building process.
The volume’s second part unfolds understandings on ‘Grand Strategy in Modern India’. Kanti Bajpai’s impressive exploratory piece identifies six schools in India’s thinking on addressing external challenges: Nehruvianism, Neoliberalism, Hindu nationalism, Marxism and Gandhism. S. Kalyanaraman delineates the well-known facets of Nehruvianism: internationalism, anti-colonialism, non-alignment, pan-Asianism, and peaceful coexistence. Narendra Sisodhia connects the neoliberal and market oriented postures in India’s geopolitical strategy of the 1990s to the 1991 economic crisis, although he agrees that this stance did not necessarily ease India’s problems with Pakistan, China and South Asia. Bharat Karnad advocates India’s use of realpolitik to `bind’ smaller states in a strategic relationship and strike a balance with `big powers’. Rahul Sagar finds in the thoughts of Savarkar and Golwalker the Hindu nationalist elucidation of `exclusionary nationalism’ and `muscular militarism’ as crucial for India’s grand strategy. He, however, cautions that stress on exclusionary nationalism can disrupt domestic cohesion in a pluralist society. Siddharth Mallavarapu uncovers the Gandhian notion of grand strategy that proposes substitution of western values with principles of truth, non-violence and a decentralized polity that should convince other societies that India does not pose a threat. Interestingly, the Marxist perspective has not been granted a separate treatment. I wonder why.
The seven articles in the third and last part of the collection delineates India’s grand strategy with regard to, what has been the called, the ‘core interests’ and ‘vital peripheries’ — Pakistan, China and the U.S. being categorised in the first segment, and Afghanistan, Iran, Israel and Africa in the second. Ali Ahmed contends that India’s recent assertive postures towards Pakistan have been ‘counter-productive’, driving Islamabad towards a ‘sub-conventional proxy war’. Tanvi Madan discusses the three perspectives on Indo-Chinese relations: optimism opting for cooperation, pessimism suggesting geostrategic encompassing of China, and pragmatism propounding a mixture of cooperation and containment. Rudra Chaudhuri explicates Indo-US relationship in terms of a fine blending of disagreements and ‘aberrant’ conversations, a format eloquently outlined in his “Forged in Crisis: India and the United States since 1947”. In the present article Rudra illustrates this format in Indo-US relations with reference to the 1950 Korean War, the 2003 Iraq War and the current Afghan stalemate.
Shanthie Mariet D’Souza views India’s strategic engagement with Afghanistan as an example of soft power diplomacy where her primary concern is creation of a pluralist democratic political order and socio-economic reconstruction, hoping these would contain terrorism and promote Afghanistan’s regional economic integration. But whether such aims could be realized without any form of military engagement remains to be seen. Delhi’s relationship with Iran, as Sarang Shidore’s perceptive essay shows, stumbles between two variables: Iran as a source of energy and deterrence to Pakistan, and Iran’s nuclear ambitions and disapproval of our Kashmir policy. However, India’s declining interest in gas pipeline project and her vote against Tehran in the International Atomic Agency, indicate her succumbing to Washington’s pressure for maintaining a safe distance from Iran. Shidore contends that pro-Americanism of the expanding Indian middle class ensured the current orientation of Delhi’s Iran policy. Nicholas Blarel explains in the context of Delhi’s changing perceptions on ‘security, autonomy and development’ the transformation of India’s Israel policy from ‘limited relationship’ of the 1950s to a ‘fuller relationship’ of the present time. Constantino Xavier’s contribution highlights a pathetic absence of India’s grand African strategy and her constant reliance on ad hoc responses.
The Introduction to the volume is particularly rewarding. Its methodological discussion on ‘grand strategy’ is succinct; its ‘rationale’ for the collection is convincing; its explication of the main arguments in the chapters is commendable. But I am not sure if India’s ‘grand strategy’ requires to be discussed only in the perspective of challenges faced by her. Instead, India’s initiatives in regional groupings like the BRICS, ASEAN and BIMSTEC and her Look East Policy, which have tremendous potentials of enhancing her international role, could have found a place in the volume. Again, Latin America has not been considered in the book, although that region is gaining importance in India’s strategic diplomacy. Besides, the increasingly strident voice of Non-Resident Indians in India’s statecraft perhaps required an attention.
The present publication has been certainly timely, coming at a time when the new regime in Delhi has started negotiating with the push and pull factors of foreign policy. It should find a place both in public and private shelves.
India’s grand strategy — History, Theory, Cases: Edited by Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit, V. Krishnappa; Routledge, 912 Tolstoy House, 15-17 Tolstoy Marg, Connaught Place, New Delhi-110001. Rs. 1295.
