As the slugfest between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton subsides following the U.S. Presidential election, serious debates may now begin on the future of Indo-U.S. relations that have defined the transformation of India’s foreign policy over last two decades
Aptly titled Indo-U.S. Relations in an Age of Uncertainty , the book by long-time America-watcher B.M. Jain outlines various triggers of this transformation. What sets him apart is his attempt at problematising the conventional state-centric narratives of international relations. He applies the ‘complex interdependence’ model of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, who explain patterns of change in inter-state relations by highlighting multiple channels of contact among societies; the lack of a clear hierarchy of issues, and the irrelevance of military force, which provides a far more appropriate frame to understandchanging India-US equations.
Guided by the geopolitics of the Cold War, the U.S. had quickly co-opted Pakistan into its military alliances, and fostered its ‘military parity’ with India, triggering an arms race and pushing India closer to the Soviet Union. There were however several positive interludes, starting from the setting up of the CIRUS nuclear research reactor in Trombay in 1954. This was followed by President Eisenhower’s visit to India in 1959 and General Electric building India’s first nuclear power plant in Tarapur during Kennedy years. But Indira Gandhi’s defiance of the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosion aggravated relations during the Johnson and Nixon years.
It was due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, coinciding with India’s drift from the socialist development model that India became the lynchpin in America’s global war on terrorism, a process that was accelerated by the September 11, 2001 attacks. The author, however, credits the ‘flowering’ Indo-US relations to the bold initiatives of George W. Bush. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice arrived in New Delhi in March 2005 leading to the signing of the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defence Relationship followed by a joint statement byManmohan Singh and Bush in July establishing their ‘global partnership’. Bush visited New Delhi in March 2006 and the two sides agreed on India’s Nuclear Separation Plan making way for the Henry J. Hyde US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act signed by Bush on December 18, 2006.
Coming a full circle in 2007, the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk took part in joint military exercises with India’s INS Viraat in the Bay of Bengal. This was the same Kitty Hawk that the U.S. had dispatched in 1971 to the Bay of Bengal to demonstrate America’s friendship with Pakistan. This opened doors for a ‘waiver’ by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the eventual signing of the Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.
From here their initial enthusiasm begins to taper-off.As regards India, the major stumbling block has come to be India’s Nuclear Liability Act of 2010 that allows operators to have legal recourse to the suppliers, provided Indian courts are of the opinion that the “nuclear incident has resulted as a consequence of an act of supplier or his employee, which includes supply of equipment or material with patent or latent defects or sub-standard services.” .
Meanwhile, as nuclear cooperation has failed to show results, much is believed to have happened in defence cooperation. U.S. defence sales have risen to $14 billion from just $200 million in 2001. However, the author sees ‘slow moving’ and ‘cautious’ bureaucracy on both sides delaying the U.S. in replacing Russia as the largest supplier of India’s defence equipment.
Jain explains this lack of identical worldviews is due to asymmetrical power structures and socio-cultural differences and hopes they will be able to focus on shared values and interests.
India-US Relations in the Age of Uncertainty; B.M. Jain, Routledge, price not mentioned.
Swaran Singh is professor for diplomacy and disarmament at School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
