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Obama’s flawed Afghan strategy

While insisting that the primary goal of the new Afghan strategy be narrow, President Barack Obama has actually widened the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and the region. He runs the risk of getting into a political and military quagmire. The “maximalists” seem to have won the debate within the administration.

Broadly speaking, those who counselled that the U.S. roll back its agenda of stabilisation of Afghanistan and put strict parameters on troop deployment and the commitment of resources — among whom was Vice-President Joseph Biden — lost ground, while those who argued for a continued commitment to the mission in Afghanistan and for dedicating the time, resources and U.S. leadership necessary to stabilise the region prevailed.

In a telling remark during a Fox Network television interview, Secretary of Defence Robert Gates, asked about the difference between George W. Bush’s “war on terror” and Mr. Obama’s “campaign against extremism,” said with barely disguised triumphalism: “I think that’s people looking for differences where there are none.” The new strategy signifies an escalation. In sum, the U.S. is launching a bloody pacification campaign.

Admittedly, there is a shift in emphasis from Mr. Bush’s war. The accent is not on making Afghanistan a western-style democracy but on making America safe from a perceived al-Qaeda threat. The raison d’etre of the war is explained in stark terms comprehensible to a U.S. public opinion that is increasingly weary of involvement in faraway wars. Thus, Mr. Obama insists that the terror syndicate is “actively planning attacks on the U.S. homeland from its safe haven in Pakistan.” He said: “We have a clear and focussed goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat the al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That’s the goal that must be achieved.”

The hyped-up new U.S. strategy — “stronger, smarter and comprehensive” — is essentially based on nine different postulates. One, there is a fundamental connection between the future of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Two, the al-Qaeda poses an existential threat to Pakistan. Three, Pakistan’s ability to meet the al-Qaeda threat is tied to its own strength and security. Four, Pakistan needs U.S. help but must be made accountable while receiving it. Five, the Taliban’s gains in Afghanistan must be reversed and a more capable and accountable Afghan government needs to be promoted. Six, the “surge” should have both military and civilian components and they need to be integrated. Seven, the requisite of enduring peace is that there should be reconciliation among former enemies. Eight, the al-Qaeda can be isolated and targeted on the pattern of the “Sunni Awakening” process successfully undertaken in Iraq. Nine, international participation is necessary, especially NATO’s.

How adequate is the U.S. Afghan strategy in coping with these postulates? First, Mr. Obama recognises the obvious truth that Pakistan is the key problem and, therefore, there has to be an “AfPak” approach. But he outlined few new options for dealing with Pakistan. The strategy envisages massive U.S. economic (and military) assistance to Pakistan and the world community’s active engagement of it. That is as far as it goes. However, the Pakistani leadership is very, very fragmented and no single source of power is in charge or has a vision of how to bring FATA into the mainstream. As the prominent Pakistani author and columnist Ahmed Rashid noted: “We have an elite, frankly, a ruling elite that is virtually in the state of collapse, and is not willing to take the leadership role and the kind of risks involved in standing up to the Taliban. And that puts the country in a very poor position.”

The military too seems increasingly lacking the capacity or will (or both) to provide leadership. Within the military, the sympathy for the Taliban and the resentment towards the U.S. are substantial. Besides, the cauldron of “anti-Americanism” in the Pakistani opinion is overflowing. Mr. Rashid, who is a consultant to the Pentagon, admits that Pakistan is “not a place where American opinion is taken very seriously. Unfortunately, Pakistan and the people are likely to respond quite negatively to the Obama proposals because of the conditionalities that are being set up. We are dealing here with a very serious crisis in Pakistan. And only time will tell how this is going to be resolved.”

Washington seems to expect that the leverage of aid and the incumbent Army chief and the President will balance out its loss of influence. But the critical question remains — the U.S. ability to reshape the attitude of the Pakistan government and the military. To be sure, that also involves a cultural change which is going to take time. Unsurprisingly, the reception to Mr. Obama’s proposals has been lukewarm in Pakistan. The pervasive opinion seems to be that it is the American presence in the region that is causing violence. Of course, this doesn’t mean increased American aid is unwelcome but ultimately, Pakistan has to do its own thinking. The conundrum explains why Mr. Obama has probably not shown his hand yet on Pakistan.

Secondly, the “Afghanisation” of the war, as outlined by Mr. Obama, involves the creation of a large, disciplined, well-trained Afghan army of 1,34,000 men and a police force of 82,000 by 2011. Building national security institutions papering over ethnic fault lines is not easy. Also, the challenge of sustaining such numbers is acute. Again, the new strategy involves the U.S. dispatching hundreds of additional diplomats and experts to Afghanistan. What they are expected to achieve in the present climate of violence and anarchy is debatable. Sources in the U.S. Congress have voiced scepticism of how realistic these plans are.

Thirdly, while stressing the need for “reconciliation among former enemies,” Mr. Obama outlined a process similar to what the U.S. pursued in Iraq, namely, to “isolate and target [the] al-Qaeda” while reaching out to adversaries. The idea is to distinguish between “an uncompromising core” of the Taliban, which must be defeated through the use of force, and those who may have taken up arms for a variety of local reasons. The strategy aims at working with the latter elements and building around them a reconciliation process in every province.

The strategy of reaching out to the moderate Taliban has been forcefully articulated by Mr. Biden, who said recently that only five per cent of the Taliban was “incorrigible” and had to be fought militarily while the rest could be separated. The expectation is that the moderates (among the Taliban) can be won “by offering them rewards, by offering them a chance to work within the government and to order their own affairs, by recognising their role in their respective regions, by providing them the resources so they can create jobs and opportunities for people,” to quote a scholar at the influential Atlantic Council. The U.S. experts are confident that it is possible to peel off the low levels of the Taliban so that the hardcore “shura” can be isolated. Meanwhile, Mr. Obama promised that the “Marines will take the fight to the Taliban in the south and the east.” Thus, in the short term, the signs are that the U.S. military operations will intensify.

Finally, as expected, the U.S. strategy emphasises a regional approach. But what does it entail? At its core lies NATO’s pivotal role. The U.S. expects its NATO partners to play a supporting role by deploying troops and offering financial and technical assistance. Washington hopes that the NATO partners will rally round the U.S. leadership role. Around this first circle of the U.S. and its western allies, Washington hopes to gather under a United Nations umbrella — “Contact Group” — non-NATO allies and regional players like Russia, China, India, Iran and the Central Asian states and countries of the Persian Gulf.

In other words, Mr. Obama’s “regional policy” means the U.S. intends to pursue its new Afghan strategy while other countries will be offered the historic opportunity to help Washington achieve its objective. Arguably, other countries, especially regional players, are bound to wonder if this does not smack of U.S. unilateralism. Indeed, a hard-nosed Moscow commentator noted: “The message is very clear: the U.S. will fight and conduct reforms in any case, while others are being invited to help. This is a very harsh approach, reminiscent of George W. Bush’s unilateral actions.” In other words, the geopolitical agenda of the U.S.’ Afghan enterprise remains intact.

Evidently, the strategy is deeply flawed. That raises the question: why such a strategy at this juncture? On balance, Mr. Obama runs the risk of getting into a quagmire of the sort that imperilled Lyndon Johnson when he inherited a war that consumed him. Therefore, the high probability is that such a “maximalist” strategy has been deliberately crafted at this stage at the outset of the Obama presidency with intent that it can always be finessed as the war progresses and if the commanders on the field fail to deliver.

(The writer is a former diplomat.)

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