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The Gates trap

It is not clear whether President-elect Barack Obama’s decision to retain Robert Gates as Secretary of Defence will have any long-term impact on the evolution of the national security doctrine of the United States. However, this carry-over from the George W. Bush years could have the deleterious effect of binding the U.S. even more tightly to the futile policy being pursued in Afghanistan. Mr. Obama was of course committed to a plan of substantially strengthening the forces fighting the “good war” well before he settled on the person who would see to its implementation. The idea is that as troops are pulled out of Iraq over the next two years, large contingents will be shifted to the military campaign being waged further east. This plan is not being shelved even though it has become evident that the Pashtun insurgency cannot be quelled by military force alone. Almost all Afghan leaders seem to have come round to the view that the urgent need is to incorporate elements of the holdout groups into the power structure in Kabul. Instead of giving due weight to this opinion, Mr. Gates and American military commanders intend to merely incorporate some ‘soft power’ components into an approach that is essentially military-centric. They argue, citing their Iraq experience, that by adding ‘boots on the ground’ they will be able to clear enough territory for carrying out a ‘hearts and minds’ programme.

Mr. Obama seems to have bought this argument without sufficient thought. Any expansion in the operations of foreign forces is bound to result in a horrifying surge in civilian casualties. The U.S. does not appear willing to adopt a Pashtun policy that replicates the approach pursued in respect of other ethnic groups. In areas dominated by the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, the natural leaders of the communities have been allowed to gain control, no matter their past record. As regards the projection of American power in the future, the multi-dimensional approach that is gaining favour can be differentiated from the military-centric doctrine characteristic of the Bush term. In the new approach, diplomacy and ‘soft power’ components are conceptualised as being as vital as military force if not more so. It is no one’s contention that President Bush would have refrained from initiating two wars if diplomats or aid workers with sensitised awareness of complex societies had warned him about the consequences. However, the American people who are fed up with having to bear the bitter cost of blundering into unknown territory will surely welcome a shift to a more nuanced power projection mode.

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