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"India wants safeguards locked to fuel supply"

R. Prasad

M.R. Srinivasan, former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, advocates caution during the ongoing Indo-U.S. nuclear negotiations. In an interview, he says any agreement should not jeopardise India's interests. Excerpts:

How do you see the signing of the July 2005 agreement by India and the United States?

The signing of the agreement certainly came as a surprise, because until then it was clear that the policies the U.S. had adopted and also got the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to adopt were such that there appeared to be no common ground to extend any civilian nuclear cooperation to India.

The discussion by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh broke new ground in accepting the realities that India had emerged as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology. The international nuclear regime should take note of that situation and find a way to open up civilian nuclear cooperation with India.

Does the agreement give India the right to decide which facilities will come under the civilian regime and which under the military regime?

The July agreement clearly stated that it was India's sovereign decision to name which facilities would be put under the civilian nuclear list under safeguards.

Many media reports point out that India is being pressured to put the fast breeder test reactor (FBTR) and the prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam under safeguards.

From the large amount of media debate, it appears that FBR is an area of contention. It has been the understanding of India from the beginning that the fast breeder test reactor and the prototype fast breeder reactor, which is a developmental reactor built with indigenous technology and components, would not be under safeguards.

Also, it has not been the situation with other advanced nuclear weapons states that they have to put their R&D facilities under safeguards.

But what about Japan?

The Japanese experience is different. It is a non-nuclear weapons state and also a signatory of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and [so] had to accept safeguards of all its facilities. It's part of the bargain with the NPT agreement. Now, India is not an NPT signatory. So the comparison of Japan with India is, in our view, not appropriate.

Is the Brazil case similar to Japan's?

Yes. Brazil is [also] a non-weapons state and an NPT signatory.

Is it right to ask India to bring fast breeder reactors under safeguards?

In the case of India, fast breeder reactors occupy a very important place. We have a long-term commitment to use thorium. And our breeder reactors have used our own designs and our own unsafeguarded plutonium [as fuel]. So we see no logic in the argument to bring fast breeder reactors under safeguards.

Now when these reactors use safeguarded plutonium from safeguarded enriched uranium or natural uranium, such reactors can be put under safeguards.

Then there are other areas of difficulties that have arisen — from what is considered as safeguards in perpetuity.

Could you elaborate?

When we import nuclear power stations that also use imported fuel, then the concept is that the reactor installation would remain under safeguards in perpetuity. That is the agreement we have in Koodankulam.

In the case of Tarapur, though the reactor and fuel came from abroad, there is no perpetuity clause and in principle we could have taken a view that at the end of the 30 years life of the agreement, which was in 1993, safeguards could not have continued. But India took the line that although the agreement had expired, we would continue to keep the Tarapur reactors under safeguards.

But when we place some of our own heavy water reactors built with our design and components under safeguards, what India expects is that safeguards will be locked with fuel supply. So when we import fuel for these reactors, the safeguards would apply so long as the fuel supply continues.

Only as long as the fuel supply continues?

Yes. Safeguards would not continue when fuel supply stops. However, [in the case of] the imported fuel that we have obtained in the meanwhile, safeguards would continue.

Was this part of the agreement?

The agreement says that we enter into an additional protocol with IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] and accept the same responsibilities and applications as advanced nuclear states.

India does not want reactors built with indigenous technology and design to be brought under perpetuity safeguards [even when the fuel supply is stopped]. However, those reactors and fuel imported would come under perpetuity safeguards.

Are they agreeable to this?

From the media reports, it appears that some sections in the U.S. seem to feel that India has to accept perpetuity safeguards and that the voluntary safeguards would be applicable to only the nuclear weapons states.

What about bringing other facilities under safeguards?

We believe that since we are using only unsafeguarded uranium or plutonium, the reprocessing or fuel fabrication facilities can't be put under safeguards. But we are opening for safeguards [facilities] that use safeguarded enriched uranium and fuel fabrication plants at Hyderabad where enriched uranium is converted into finished fuel.

So the nuclear fuel complex (NFC) at Hyderabad would be put under safeguards?

No, no. At NFC, there is one plant that is purely for fabrication of imported enriched uranium. That plant alone would be put under safeguards.

What about the reprocessing plants at Tarapur and Kalpakkam?

When reprocessing natural uranium from the Rajasthan reactors [RAPS 1 & 2 which are safeguarded reactors], the Tarapur reprocessing facility is put under safeguards. That is called campaign safeguards.

Can you explain?

The Tarapur reprocessing plant reprocesses safeguarded and unsafeguarded fuels. When it is reprocessing safeguarded fuel, for that period of time when the fuel is reprocessed the safeguards are applied. Not at other times.

Can it work the other way around — put the reprocessing plants under safeguards and not apply safeguards when reprocessing fuel from designated military facilities?

Why? We do not want to put them [reprocessing plants] under safeguards in the first place.

Will the U.S. see India's logic?

But these are plants built with our own technology and the question of putting them under safeguards does not arise.

Will India's emphasis on putting many facilities under military regime give an impression that our intentions are different?

The concern is that attempts are now being made to cap our programme. Now India started weaponisation later than other countries. China has been making fissile material for its weapons programme since the 1960s. Its arsenal is growing. We have relatively modest fissile material for the weapons programme.

So this agreement should not have an impact on our strategic programme. The international community and the U.S. should be assured that India inherently does not believe in indulging in an arms race. Access to fissile material does not mean we want to use all that for weapon-making.

Supposing we accept safeguards for the FBTR and PFBR, there will be much of plutonium available for weapon making. So we are reducing the amount of plutonium by putting the PFBR in the unsafeguarded regime.

So our interests are not to keep large fissile material for weapons purpose but [to ensure] that our R&D activities do not come under the safeguard regime.

But the U.S. also wants to bring a majority of pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWR) under the safeguards list.

We would like to keep a sufficient number of PHWRs in the military list in order to make available sufficient amounts of tritium for weapons application.

Is it possible to switch a facility from one regime to another at any point in the future?

The additional protocol that the U.S. has signed with IAEA gives them that freedom to switch between civilian and military regimes. I am not sure about other countries.

The U.S. has a way of dangling the carrot to finally make countries toe its line. Is it any different in this case?

It is part of the way the U.S. operates and at the same time many countries have learnt to live with the U.S. kind of decision-making process and continue to cooperate [with the U.S.]

So we want to ensure that we enter into an agreement that would not jeopardise India's interests. Therefore we should be careful with the negotiations.

There are some people [in India] who are suggesting that with this agreement, we should not argue too much as larger Indo-U.S. strategic interests are evolving. While I agree that we should look at the larger perspectives, India should also ensure that nuclear independence should not be sacrificed.

The U.S. and other countries have traditionally been ready to cooperate when we have developed a strategic technology or critical components. Is it any different now?

Well, this you can say is the guiding principle — less in need from outside, more the willingness to supply. So this is the kind of situation that one should expect. But we should not get into a situation of over dependence and at the same time should not carry the argument to an extreme. So it is beneficial to cooperate but such cooperation should be between equal partners and not between unequal partners.

But can we consider India and other nuclear weapons states as equal partners?

The issue is, we have developed the technology to build reactors though our programme is moving at a slow pace. In the case of fast breeder reactor, at this point of time, we have a lead at least in the basic science and technology [compared with the U.S. and Britain]. But it doesn't mean we are ready to build reactors of high capacity. We expect to get there and that is the important thing.

What will happen if India is pressured to put fast breeder reactors under safeguards?

We don't believe that question has to be addressed at this point of time when negotiations are still going on. We believe the flexibility that is required for development of the [breeder] technology will not be there under the safeguards regime.

How much would India stand to lose if the negotiations fail?

Growth would be slower; the nuclear energy programme will not come to a halt. But we believe that if a country like China which has had an adversarial position with the U.S. can access civilian nuclear technology without sacrificing its weapons programme, then it seems odd that India is denied of it. It doesn't stand the test of logic.

All the more, as India has never indulged in any proliferation activities unlike China and some other nuclear weapons states. So it seems a paradox if India is denied civilian nuclear energy despite its exemplary records [of nuclear non-proliferation].

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"India wants safeguards locked to fuel supply"

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