The Hindu : Report's focus on NASA management

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Thursday, Jun 26, 2003

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International

Report's focus on NASA management

WASHINGTON JUNE 25. In their strongest statement yet on the Columbia disaster, investigators said that flyaway foam from the fuel tank was ``the most probable cause'' of the wing damage that brought down the space shuttle almost five months ago.

``We've been trying to line up all the Swiss cheese holes. I think those holes have lined up pretty good,'' Roger Tetrault, a member of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, said on Tuesday.

Mr. Tetrault said he believes the deadly breach was located part way down the leading edge of Columbia's left wing, at or near carbon panel No. 8.

The engineering analysis as well as the shuttle wreckage pinpoints that location, he said.

That is the spot — or close to it — where a 600-gm chunk of foam insulation from the external fuel tank struck during lift-off back in January.

``When you put all of those pieces of Swiss cheese together, it's a pretty compelling story that, in fact, the foam is the most probable cause of the shuttle accident,'' said Mr. Tetrault, a retired corporate executive who used to build nuclear submarines.

It was the first time any of the 13 board members, publicly at least, blamed the foam for the Feb. 1 disaster.

All seven astronauts aboard were killed.

Also on Tuesday, NASA released video and photographs of the crew salvaged from the 38,560 kgs of wreckage. They showed the five men and two women posing for official portraits, playing with objects in weightlessness and demonstrating daily routines like shaving and brushing teeth.

Final report in July

Now that they have determined the most probable cause of the disaster, the investigators are struggling with how best to word the finding in their final report, expected by the end of July.

``The board will have to decide what word we want to use,'' said the board's chairman, retired Navy Adm. Harold Gehman Jr. ``Do we want to say, `We think it did, we're sure it did, it might of, we think most likely it did, the board is confident?'

Adm. Gehman expects to release an interim recommendation to NASA, possibly as early as this week, emphasizing the need for caution to avoid damage to the wings' thermal protection shielding on every flight and to repair problems in orbit.

``The board is trying to craft words which will force NASA to do something,'' he said.

Half the final report will focus on NASA management and culture, he said. The other half will involve technical matters, most notably the loss of foam from space shuttle external fuel tanks during every launch for the past 22 years.

NASA needs to stop flyaway foam as best it can, especially larger pieces, and toughen the shuttles' ability to endure these kinds of strikes because they probably will continue, Adm. Gehman said. NASA should be able to resume shuttle flights in six to nine months, after correcting the most pressing problems, Adm. Gehman said.

The board will not deal with the need for a crew-escape system, leaving that painful debate and decision to NASA, he said.

The commission that investigated the 1986 explosion that destroyed the space shuttle Challenger also did not make any recommendation regarding an escape pod or other redesign, he noted. ``We would have to do a complete study of how close the crew came to surviving and how long they lived and what they died from and all that kind of stuff, and we elected not to do that,'' he said. Mr. Tetrault said only two other possibilities, besides foam, exist for the disintegration of Columbia during its return to Earth. ``I can't eliminate micrometeorites, although I think the possibility of that is extremely small,'' he said. None of the sensors indicated a strike by space junk, he noted. The only other possibility is a strike by a broken bolt or its housing during lift-off. Radar indicated a piece of debris flying away 126 seconds after the launch.

It's possible the debris was part of one of the bolts that hold the boosters and external fuel tank together or the container that catches the bolt halves after they are explosively severed. Foam-impact tests should help confirm the board's leading theory, said a NASA official serving on the board. — AP

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