The Hindu : Insurgent politics

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Saturday, Apr 19, 2003

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Insurgent politics

By Wasbir Hussain

The authorities must put in place a mechanism to ensure that cadres of a rebel group that has entered into a truce with the Government do not behave as if they are above the law.

A NEW front has emerged in Assam's insurgency and ethnic minefield. If two small ethnic groups' deciding to set aside their age-old harmonious coexistence and to get locked in a bloody turf war is bad enough, the involvement or realignment of heavily-armed rebel outfits in the conflict is an ominous development. In fact, the bout of mindless arson and rioting between two hill tribal communities concentrated in southern Assam — the Dimasas and the Hmars — for nearly two months now, is the direct outcome of the actions of rebel groups claiming to represent both these communities. The result: innocent civilians being drawn into the vortex of this conflict.

The root of this ongoing Hmar-Dimasa ethnic feud can be traced to the February 24 abduction of three important members of the Dima Halam Daogah (DHD), a Dimasa rebel group active in southern Assam's North Cazchar Hills district, bordering Manipur and Nagaland, by cadres of its former ally, National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah). The abduction, which was apparently carried out with the help of the Hmar People's Convention (Democratic), Hmar rebel group, led to a string of retaliatory attacks by armed Dimasas, triggering counter-attacks.

The biggest such attack that turned the ethnic feud into a full-scale riot was the raid on at least two Dimasa villages in the Cachar district by Hmar gunmen on March 31. Around 30 Dimasa farmers were kidnapped. The attackers later shot 23 of them dead. Four persons are missing while several others are in hospital. This resulted in the Dimasas hitting back at the minority Hmars, displacing hundreds of people. Over 200 houses, mostly belonging to the Hmars, have since been torched by armed raiders.

The 1991 Census put the total population of Dimasas in Assam at 65,104, and the Hmars at 11,189. The two groups have been living peacefully in the area for decades. In 1995, some radical Dimasa youths formed the DHD to fight for the rights of their comparatively marginalised community. The DHD aligned itself with the NSCN (I-M) with the latter agreeing to provide its cadres arms and training in return for a share of "tax", which is essentially extortion money, collected from almost everyone in the North Cachar Hills district, Government officials and elected local councillors included. The DHD-NSCN (I-M) combine created a reign of terror in the area. The terrain provided them easy trans-border access between Assam, Nagaland or Manipur. Everything was going well for this rebel alliance until the DHD started pushing its demand for a separate Dimasa homeland or Dimaraji openly. What caused the rift between the DHD and the NSCN (I-M) was the former's claim to the bustling town of Dimapur, Nagaland's commercial hub, as an integral part of Dimaraji. Dimapur, from the DHD's point of view, belongs to the Dimasas as their chieftains lorded over their people in the past with the town as a focal point. The NSCN (I-M) would not think of ceding any Naga-inhabited area to anyone, and would rather want parts of Assam to be merged into its proposed "Greater Nagaland" plan. The other reason why the DHD severed its ties with the NSCN (I-M) was the latter's claim to the large chunk of "tax" collected by the DHD, either on its own or jointly, from areas dominated by the Dimasas. After it parted ways with the DHD, the NSCN (I-M) moved closer to the little-known Hmar People's Convention (Democratic). On the surface, the current violence in southern Assam may look like an ethnic riot as it has all the ingredients of one. But, it is actually a battle for territorial supremacy between rival insurgent groups. The DHD has already entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Government, and a deal is likely on the lines of the agreement for greater autonomy clinched between the Bodo rebel group, the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), and the Centre in February. Therefore, the DHD could now be keen on going ahead with an ethnic cleansing in the areas of its dominance to oust whatever little Hmar population may be there. The Hmars, or the Hmar rebel groups such as the HPC (D), may have seen through the DHD game plan, forcing them to move closer to the NSCN (I-M) for support. This may or may not be the case, but the NSCN (I-M) aligning itself with the HPC (D) immediately after severing its ties with the DHD goes to show the fragile nature of rebel alliances in the northeast. It has proved that most of such tie-ups are marriages of convenience or opportunistic. Within months of severing its links with the Dimasa outfit, the NSCN (I-M) is being accused by the authorities in Assam of setting ablaze Dimasa homes and threatening members of the community.

Another aspect that cannot be overlooked is the extent of undesirable activities in which insurgent groups in the region indulge after entering into a truce with the Government or security forces. A ceasefire to enable the rebel group concerned and the Government to hold peace talks often provides cadres of such an insurgent outfit enough space to manoeuvre, such as regrouping, replenishing their weapons and ammunition supplies and mass-contact. This becomes possible because of the near-free movement that the rebels come to enjoy after entering into a truce with the authorities. In the current case, too, two of the warring groups, the DHD and the NSCN (I-M), have entered into ceasefire agreements with the Government.

In such situations, the authorities in the region, as elsewhere in the country, often prefer to go for fire-fighting measures, and nothing more. The Assam administration in the current case called out the Army to tackle the riots. New Delhi on its part responded by rushing the Minister of State for Home, I. D. Swami, to the State. Mr. Swami promised two things during his visit: payment of an ex-gratia amount of Rs. 1 lakh to each of those killed in the ethnic feud, and enhancement of Central funds towards the modernisation of the Assam Police. These are measures that cannot in any way address the problem. The Centre and the State Governments in the Northeast must review their policy, if there is one, on the modalities of a ceasefire before holding peace talks with one or the other insurgent groups in the region, many of which are no better than rag-tag bands of armed men. The authorities must put in place a mechanism to ensure that cadres of a rebel group that has entered into a truce with the Government do not behave as if they are above the law. Going by the situation on the ground as of now, neither the NSCN (I-M) nor the DHD cadres are adhering to the mutually agreed ceasefire ground rules, nor are the rebels staying put in their designated camps. The result is that violence is continuing, and newer fronts, often avoidable, are being created in this already turbulent frontier.

(The writer is an Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi)

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