The Hindu : New face of war

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Saturday, Apr 12, 2003

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

New face of war

By V.R. Raghavan

War has many faces. The ugly face of war is often portrayed with the picture of soldiers mowed down by machine guns and fallen like sheaves of corn. The valorous face has the soldier or his leaders leading the battle charge in the face of fire. Who has not heard of the Charge of the Light Brigade? The willingness to die even to implement a foolish or inept General's command has for long been portrayed as the epitome of military discipline and loyalty.

Thirty years ago soldiers were expected to engage in CQB, or, close quarter battle. Those battles involved fighting with your personal weapon and bayonet in hand to hand combat. Personal courage in the face of fire was the ultimate test of a soldier's mettle. The Indian Army still fights like that, as do many others. The evidence is to be seen in the citations of gallantry awards read at the investiture ceremonies year after year. It is almost as if the soldiers' willingness to die is a celebration of valour for its own sake. There is little thought spared for the relevance of this endless waste of the bravest of our braves.

IT-enabled

The war now reaching its final stage of defeat for the Iraqi military forces has its own face. It is one of distant combat conducted with information technology. The emphasis is on conserving the soldiers' lives. It is based on the belief vividly expressed by General Patton to the effect that the best soldier makes the enemy die in battle instead of dying himself.

The new face of war places a premium on creating conditions of military dominance, in which soldiers can conduct operations instead of being mere cannon fodder. That was the essential difference between the coalition forces and Saddam Hussein's army. Engaging in a war without even a modicum of air cover, with outgunned forces, out of communication with his forces from the first day, conveys neither military acumen nor concern for the men being asked to fight. Indeed, those who stood and fought in the name of Iraq, had the battles lost by the Iraqi President before they had started. The fighting still continuing is being conducted by ultra loyalists to save their patrons and will end in defeat.

The Second Iraq War sets the stage for wars of the 21st Century. Future wars cannot be won by personal valour alone. The soldier's will needs to be backed by overwhelming firepower, mobility and communications. Even more, battles would have to be fought with ground, air and sea-based platforms, firepower and special forces networked by information technology.

Integrated warfare

The days of seeking battlefield intelligence by foot patrols are over. U.S. forces used battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance methods where unarmed air vehicles were launched by frontline troops. The air force including helicopter gunships were available within minutes of being sought by ground troops. The air arm did not wait to fight its own battles before backing the ground forces' advance. Integrated warfare conducted by forces under one supreme commander produced the victory, overcoming peacetime inter-service turf wars.

The main difference between the First and Second Iraq Wars was the reduction of time between finding the target and destroying it. This was attained both for frontline troops as well as for strategic targets. The time gap between intelligence about Mr. Hussein and his sons in a downtown restaurant and the strike was 10 to 12 minutes. This level of operational response was attained through a networked war zone. This meant maximum battlefield information being available on occurrence. If minefields were noticed by airborne infrared sources, the information was with the forward troops almost in real time. Infantry or tanks did not have to blow themselves up to learn of minefields.

Major distrust

Mr. Hussein had built a military whose major wings distrusted each other. The army's loyalties were suspect and the Republican Guards were created to keep it under watch. During the 1991 War, Republican Guards took a heavy battering and were quickly pulled back to Baghdad to protect Mr. Hussein. The inept handling of that war had led to some soul searching in the force. Suspecting disaffection in the Republican Guards, the Special Republican Guards were raised to watch over them. Those who worked with the Iraqi military watched with despair the frequent and arbitrary changes of senior commanders, without regard for operational efficiency. Promotions and postings were wholly based on personal loyalties. Training a military whose internal cohesion is constantly disturbed was never easy.

On the eve of the current war, Mr. Hussein's two sons were made overall commanders of forces in sensitive districts. Izzat Ibrahim, an elderly loyalist with minimal military experience, was placed in command of another. The war was beginning to go out of Mr. Hussein's control before it had begun.

The bravery and dedication of individual Iraqi officers and soldiers were expected to provide the glue to the military machine. It could not survive in the face of firepower delivered with extraordinary precision and in overpowering volume. Iraqi military was simply outmanoeuvred and its leaders deserted the troops. The new face of war is there for all military and political leaders to see.

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