The Hindu : India's stand on Iraq

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Monday, Apr 07, 2003

Opinion

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India's stand on Iraq

By K. K. Katyal

Those in India who feel Washington may be annoyed if New Delhi favours a U.N. role (in Iraq after the war) need not worry. There will be voices in the U.S., and more so in the U.K., supporting a role for the world body.

THE DEBATE on the Indian stand on Iraq threw up two words, "middle path" and "flexibility", often used by the Government and its critics in support of their viewpoints. The "middle path" lost its validity after the United States-led invasion of Iraq, and the subsequent fast changes in the ground situation. This much is conceded by the Government impliedly, if not explicitly. What else is the meaning of the BJP national executive's resolution in the presence of top Government leaders on the "unjustified war", criticising the role of the U.S. and the U.K. and demanding that the solution be found within the United Nations framework? However, it is only a change of emphasis, not policy. The official side feels that it retains the "flexibility" acquired through the cautious stand, which could be used to play a positive role, though its precise nature cannot be forecast for obvious reasons.

There was an opportunity for the Government to exploit the advantage of its resilience in the run-up to the attack, especially during the intense diplomatic activity at the U.N. and elsewhere. It was not found possible, perhaps, because of the inexorable march of events towards the brink. The Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, did take one significant step — he wrote to the heads of the P-5 Governments, pinpointing the responsibilities cast on them by their privileged position in the world body and stressing the urgency of making collective efforts to find a solution through means other than recourse to war. Had the Prime Minister's letter and similar other activities been publicised, the criticism of the Government would have been muted.

The Government defended its cautious line on pragmatic grounds. Its mutually contrasting approach consisted of low-key statements in public, and emphatic expression of views in private. The idea was to remain firm on the side of peace but not to let differences with the U.S. come in the way of strengthening the "strategic partnership" with it. As was stated by Mr. Vajpayee at the last all-party meet on March 22: "Our words, actions and diplomatic efforts should be aimed at trying to achieve pragmatic goals rather than creating rhetorical effect. Quiet diplomacy is far more effective than public posturing." In any case, there was to be no occasion for this policy to be tested in practice — unlike in the case of the 1991 Gulf War. The U.S., then, sought New Delhi's permission, first, for overflight of its military aircraft and, later, for refuelling facilities. The Janata Dal Government — I. K. Gujral was the External Affairs Minister then — conceded the first request, while taking care not to make it public, and the Chandra Shekhar Government agreed to the second. The second permission became known, as mentioned in these columns, accidentally, raising a storm of protest by vast sections. No such requests are expected now.

How can the "flexibility" be made use of in the coming days and weeks? It all depends on the emerging situation. Let us take the most likely case scenario — military success for the U.S. and its occupation of Iraq — after large-scale destruction, death of thousands, injury to much larger numbers and untold sufferings. This, coupled with the hostility of the general mass of people and guerrilla activities, may make the situation highly unmanageable. There may, thus, be an occasion to bring the U.N. back in the picture, despite its dismal record in failing toavert the war or bringing about a ceasefire. The U.S. could be expected to seek legitimacy for its invasion with retrospective effect, with the implied blessing by the world body of the unilateral step. After an initial spell of military administration, the U.S. may like the U.N. to be associated with a new dispensation, consisting of Iraqis — needless to say, confirmed anti-Saddam elements and dissidents in exile. If and when reached, it could be a tricky stage. The U.S. may prefer a nominal association of the U.N. with a set-up essentially controlled by it and the U.K. Others may oppose this extension of unilateralism from the military to the civilian field. They would like the U.N. to play an effective role in relation to the new dispensation in Iraq. That could be an occasion for India to make credible use of its "flexibility".

But before the shape of the future administration is finalised, there will be the immediate, urgent task of relief, supply of essential items and medicines and treatment of the injured. Here again, the question may arise whether the control of the humanitarian effort should be with the U.N. or the U.S. and the U.K. Washington may not like, say, France and Germany to have an equal say in matters related to the humanitarian effort. India, along with like-minded countries, could well throw its weight on the side of the U.N. A challenging task for Indian diplomacy.

It would require total concentration and, as such, there has to be no distraction by the controversies of the past. Some of the issues, that held the key to peace, have become irrelevant. For instance, the controversy over the role of weapons inspectors, mandated by the U.N. under the Security Council resolution 1441, has become meaningless. Similarly, issues — such as whether the U.S. action is to be "deplored" or "condemned" — do not have the same topical validity as they did last month. The deed has been done. The "middle path" is not relevant now, as already stated.

The essentials of the Government's position are spelt out in the official statements on the commencement of military action and just before that. On March 18, it said "our counsel has been against war and in favour of peace. We have emphasised that all decisions on Iraq must be taken under the authority of the United Nations. We have stated that any move for change in regime in Iraq should come from within and not be imposed from outside. We have also been drawing attention to the precarious humanitarian situation of the Iraqi people which war would only aggravate. We are deeply disappointed by the inability of the U.N. Security Council to act collectively, especially the failure of the Permanent Members to harmonise their position on Iraq.''

Two days later, on the day of the attack, the Government, repeating the earlier concerns, expressed "grave concern that continuing differences within the Security Council prevented a harmonisation of the positions of its members, resulting in seriously impairing the U.N. system. The military action begun today lacks justification. It also appears from the pronouncements of Hans Blix and Al Baradei (U.N. inspectors) that military action was avoidable.''

It would be unrealistic, on the face of it, to expect the U.S. to be accommodative of the U.N. now, when earlier, at a more difficult stage, it chose the unilateral path. With Iraq under its control and having paid a heavy price in monetary terms, $ 75 billion according to official estimates, and having suffered casualties, it would not be inclined to let the U.N. — and, through it, France and others — have a finger in the Iraq pie. But there is the other side of the coin. Washington may need the world body for political and other reasons. The U.S. and the U.K. are widely seen as occupation powers, not as liberators, in the Muslim world. The public opinion in these countries is already agitated and things may get worse when the extent of the damage in Iraq — death of thousands of civilians and destruction of infrastructure — is known. The "allies", in that case, may require the U.N. cover to save themselves from the consequences of people's wrath. Those in India who feel Washington may be annoyed if New Delhi favours a U.N. role need not worry. There will be voices in the U.S., and more so in the U.K., supporting a role for the world body. In any case, India will be operating within the set parameters — of preserving, deepening and expanding relations with the U.S.

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