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The race to Baghdad

By C. Raja Mohan

Regaining the element of surprise with an early land invasion after the failed initial salvo against Saddam Hussein, American military forces have begun to underline the defining features of Operation Iraqi Freedom — speed and mobility.

The world has rarely seen before such a rapid movement of a massive military machine. As the 7th Cavalry of the U.S. Army, with the 3 Infantry Division behind it, rolls along the Euphrates river towards Baghdad, the American strategy to enforce regime change in Iraq has become clearer.

Contrary to widespread expectations, there has been no carpet-bombing of Baghdad by the United States this time. Air power is indeed is being used — to facilitate the rapid ground advance rather than to flatten the Iraqi capital. Air raids have resumed on Baghdad, but not in an indiscriminate manner.

The "shock and awe'' of the aerial campaign, much advertised in Washington before the war started, is apparently being reserved for the decisive final stage. The immediate task for American forces is to surround Baghdad in a two-flank movement — one along the west of the Euphrates and the other east of the Tigris.

While some coalition forces are darting to Baghdad, others have sought to capture the commercial jugular of the Iraqi state — the ports of Umm Qasr and Basra. The region around the two ports is the home to vital oil installations. The two ports, which are the economic lifeline of Iraq, will also be useful for the coalition forces to bring in relief supplies to Basra and beyond.

Once the south is secured, the U.S. expects to tighten the noose around Saddam Hussein. The political hope in Washington is that the rapid advance of the coalition troops will force deep fissures in the regime and ensure its quick collapse.

The Pentagon, which wants to avoid a street-to-street fighting in Baghdad, will resort to a massive air campaign if the regime refuses to rapidly disintegrate. The very politically-driven military operations of the U.S. this time are determined to avoid a large-scale confrontation as long as possible.

An important military calculation of the Bush administration is that the Iraqi regular troops will not put up much of a fight and the elite Republican Guards will fold along with the regime. On Day Two of Operation Iraqi Freedom, this premise remains to be tested.

Pentagon planners have given the highest priority to maintain communication with Iraqi military leaders to avoid large-scale fighting. While some defections from Iraqi Army have been reported, they are yet to become a flood. There also has been some unexpected resistance.

There is a bigger question mark over the political assumption in Washington that the Iraqi people will welcome the American troops as "forces of liberation''. Saddam Hussein's defiance is based on the exact opposite.

So far American troops have had no opportunity to deal with large urban environments. The reaction of the Iraqi people should be available shortly in Basra and this in turn could give a clue on how long this war will last.

If that reaction in Basra falls short of American expectations, the U.S. strategy for Operation Iraqi Freedom could come under severe stress. Besides the many problems in the war zone, a hostile Iraqi reception would rapidly undercut political support in the U.S. for the invasion of Iraq.

Without a positive support from the Iraqi people, the proposed siege of Baghdad could turn out to be a logistical nightmare. The electrifying American race towards Baghdad, far away from the home base in Kuwait, could then become very difficult to sustain. All the high technology weapons of America and the dazzling mobility of its forces are of no great use, if the men cannot be supplied with water, food, fuel and ammunition.

Saddam Hussein's strategy is to hunker down in Baghdad and hope to strike back at American forces once they are drawn in deeply and their supply lines are stretched out.

The U.S., in contrast, needs early and visible popular enthusiasm for its forces in Iraq. That is why the first images out of Basra are so crucial for both Washington and Baghdad.

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Stories in this Section

• U.N. Council must Act
• The final test
• In self-destruct mode
• Caught in the crossfire
• The race to Baghdad
• War on Iraq
• Glorious decades

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