The Hindu : A flawed strategy

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Saturday, Sep 07, 2002

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A flawed strategy

By Navnita Chadha Behera

If there is a high voter turnout and the elections are generally seen to be `free and fair', the Hurriyat runs the risk of being completely marginalised in the international arena.

THE HURRIYAT Conference and the Democratic Freedom Party led by Shabir Shah — the key political outfits among the separatist ranks — have refused to participate in the coming Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir. Initially, the Hurriyat chairperson, Abdul Gani Bhat, debunked the elections as an "irrelevant exercise", a position modified last week by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq who argued that the Hurriyat was willing to contest the elections if they are linked to the resolution of the Kashmir imbroglio.

Having failed to persuade the powers-that-be in New Delhi to initiate a serious dialogue before the elections, both are partly responding to the growing, albeit contradictory, international pressures: from the United States to contest and from Pakistan to boycott elections and partly trying to assure the people in the Valley that their struggle for the right to self-determination has not died down. Their strategy, however, is seriously flawed.

The secessionist movement in Kashmir has consistently and progressively failed to mobilise international support for the cause of self-determination. When the Kashmiri youth took to the gun in 1989-90, they were inspired by the resurgence of Islam after the Iranian revolution, the Palestinian intifada and the mujahideen success in driving the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. The heady sweep of contemporary liberation history from dismantling of the Berlin Wall to the alluring echoes of freedom along the trans-Caucasian Pamir nearer home also made "azadi" appear as a plausible alternative. By the mid-1990s, however, the international situation had undergone a sea-change, belying the Kashmiris' expectations. Afghanistan had degenerated into a civil war between warring mujahideen factions and by 1995-96, the Taliban's imposition of medieval and anarchic Islamic practices had brought home the dangers of Islamising their own society.

The second plank on which the separatist leaders sought international support was the violation of Kashmiris' human rights with Pakistan acting as their spokesperson. After the initial barrage of criticism of the Indian Government, this too petered out. As the Indian Government improved its human rights record and opened the Valley to diplomats and the foreign press, the submissions of Pakistan's armed support to the Kashmiris gained credence. By 1993-94, the tables had turned on Pakistan and it was persuaded by `Islamic' Iran and by its friend, China, against moving any resolution against India at the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva in 1993.

The last straw for the Hurriyat leadership was the oft-repeated statements made in some Western capitals that a resolution of the Kashmir conflict must take into account the "wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir". While the Hurriyat has enjoyed the growing international attention it has received in the past few months from visiting American and European delegations, it has failed to recognise a subtle yet significant shift in the U.S. strategy which views the coming Assembly elections as a critical input into the peace process. Except Pakistan, there are no international players including the U.N. that support the modality of a plebiscite for ascertaining the wishes of the Kashmiris. Elections are therefore considered to be the next best option for choosing their representatives. If there is a high voter turnout and the elections are generally seen to be `free and fair', the Hurriyat runs the risk of being completely marginalised in the international arena.

If the Hurriyat leadership was looking for Pakistan's endorsement for elections to be the correct modality of choosing the representatives of the Kashmiris, it was futile. The Pakistani leadership has invested heavily in propping up the Hurriyat as the sole spokesperson of the Kashmiris and would naturally equate the Hurriyat's refusal to participate in elections with the Kashmiris' rejection of the Indian state. For Pakistan, therefore, the political relevance and legitimacy of the Hurriyat will last only as long as it does not participate in the elections. Hence, the mounting pressure by the United Jihad Council for the Hurriyat to call for a boycott of the elections and the renewed threats of liquidation if anyone considered participation in the elections.

While this serves Pakistan's interest, where does this leave the Hurriyat? It must surely realise that Pakistan has neither the political will nor the wherewithal to liberate Kashmir by force. It can, at best bleed the Indian state in Kashmir but that would make the Kashmiris mere pawns in its bigger game plan. In the post-September 11 world, Pakistan is also under growing international pressure to stop the infiltration across the Line of Control and not disturb the State Assembly elections. The U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and his Deputy, Richard Armitage. have both underlined the importance of holding free and fair elections and urged Pakistan to exercise its utmost influence over the militants for not disrupting them. The paradox is that while Pakistan has high stakes in Kashmir, it lacks the muscle to force New Delhi's hands in negotiating the future of Pakistan and other international players such as the U.S. that may be in a position to exercise that influence have little stakes for doing so.

The only way the Hurriyat could negotiate with New Delhi from a position of strength was for it to emerge as a viable political alternative to the National Conference, backed by the masses in Jammu and Kashmir. The Hurriyat's claim that it does not want to fight the elections only to run the State administration does not stand scrutiny. First, the elections must be viewed as an instrument for mobilising people's power. Notwithstanding its protestations or claims otherwise, the Hurriyat must prove its representative credentials. At present, it is widely perceived to be representing the political interests of the majority community — the Kashmiri Muslims — alone. While this is important, it is not good enough. If it must speak in the name of the "people of Jammu and Kashmir', it must build coalitions with the people, political parties and political outfits in Jammu and Ladakh as well. Elections, despite all their flaws, remain the only modality available to it for doing so. If it wins these elections, it could force the Centre to negotiate the political future of State and also earn the respect and support of the international community.

In the State's troubled history, there have been only two occasions when the Kashmiri leadership has forced New Delhi to make concessions or at least put it on the defensive. The first was when Sheikh Abdullah negotiated the 1952 Agreement with New Delhi. Pandit Nehru's decision to grant special status to Kashmir rested on his belief that the Sheikh enjoyed a mass political base in the State and New Delhi could count upon that for winning the plebiscite and bringing about the accession of Jammu and Kashmir with the Indian Union. And, then in 1988-89, the Central leadership was unnerved during the initial phase of the militant movement spearheaded by the JKLF. However, the real threat to the Indian state was not from the Kashmiri militant struggle but from the mass upsurge of Kashmiris which symbolised the total rejection of the state authority.

Finally, the Hurriyat needs to realise that providing humane governance to the brutalised and traumatised people of the Kashmir Valley, indeed the entire State, is of critical importance in its own right. While the Kashmiris may still cherish the dream of azadi, few share the naive belief of the early 1990s that azadi is round the corner. Therefore, without detracting their support to the broader political goals of the movement, Kashmiris also want a local MLA who they could approach for redress of their day-to-day grievances. This is the message the people of north Kashmir have sought to convey by welcoming the decision of the People's Conference to contest the elections. If the Hurriyat and the Democratic Freedom Party are fighting the people's battle, they must not run away from the battleground.

(The writer is Reader, Department of Political Science, Delhi University.)

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